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Executive Summary 
 
For a long time after 1945, Higher Education (HE) in the UK was provided free of charge 
as Local Education Authorities (LEAs) paid each student’s HE tuition fees. In addition, the 
Education  Act  of  1962  introduced  a  national  Mandatory  Awards  system  for  student 
maintenance grant. However, when HE participation increased steadily during the 1980s 
and  1990s,  the  total  amount  of  necessary  funding  did  not  rise  in  line  with  the  HE 
expansion and it became untenable to subsidize HE. In response to the HE expansion and 
the heavy burden this imposed on public expenditure, new HE policies were formulated, 
which shifted part of the financing burden from the state to the students and/or their 
families by introducing student loans in 1990/91, scrapping student grants through the 
1990’s and charging tuition fees since 1998/99. The central policy question is – have the 
less generous student financial support arrangements had any effect on the participation 
in post-compulsory education? Although it was argued that these funding arrangements 
would  provide  the  policy  makers  leverage  to  widen  participation,  there  has  been 
increased concern that these reforms could reverse the trend of rising participation in 
post-compulsory education.  
 
Empirically an issue in estimating the causal effect of the HE finance policies on the 
demand for post-compulsory education in a time-series framework is that, throughout 
the time period in question, in addition to the changes in HE finance described above, 
there  has  been  a  sequence  of  other  policy  changes  that  might  have  had  important 
impacts on the participation rates as well as other key variables. Are these policy changes 
linked to structural breaks, i.e., statistically robust shifts in means and trends, in the 
demand for post-compulsory education and other key variables, and in the  model of 
post-compulsory  education  participation?  And  to  what  extent  do  the  trends  in  post-
compulsory education participation rates represent a change in the underlying demand 
for  post-compulsory  education,  rather  than  short-run  dynamic  adjustments, 
demographic changes or structural break responses to HE funding policy changes?  
  
This paper addresses these questions over a sample period from 1955 to 2008 which saw 
great  variation  in  education  policies.  Instead  of  arbitrarily  choosing  break  points  by 
eyeballing  the data  series,  we  apply  a  newly  developed  approach  by Qu  and  Perron 
(2007) to detect and estimate the nature and timing of these breaks so as to obtain 
robust estimation results.  
 
Our structural change tests suggest that regime changes in HE funding, especially the 
introduction of student loans in 1990, and the scrapping of student grants initiated from 
early 1990s, did result in significant structural breaks in the model of post-compulsory 
education participation. Our estimation outcomes do lend credence to the view that the 
less  generous  student  support  arrangement  deters  HE  participation.  Specifically,  the 
results suggest a clear negative relationship between the net college costs and university 
entrance rates for both males and females, as has been found in many studies based on 
individual data, especially in the US literature. Moreover, among the samples split by the 
estimated  break  dates,  the  most  recent  periods  always  exhibit  significantly  negative 
effects  of  college  costs.  The  parameter estimates  for  males  and females  are  broadly 
comparable in terms of signs, although the magnitude is always larger for males.  
 
Our  policy  simulation  indicates  that  if  the  cap  of  fees  is  increased  to  £7,000,  the 
university enrolment rate would decrease from 2008 by 5.33 percentage points for boys, 
and 2.84 percentage points for girls. Further, assuming that the cap of fees is increased 
to £9,000, calculation indicates that the university entrance rate would decrease from 
2008 by 7.51 and 4.92 percentage points for boys and girls, respectively. From Grants to Loans and Fees: The Demand for Post-
Compulsory Education in England and  
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1.  Introduction 
The UK university system is on the cusp of a seismic change. From September 2012 most 
universities will be charging £9,000 per year in fees for each undergraduate. This change 
will be accompanied by a major reduction in core central funding from the government. 
These changes will cause a structural shift in the way universities do business. Most 
critically, universities need to know what the effect of the raising student fees will be on 
the demand for university places. The future shape of the UK university system will 
depend on the nature of this reaction but little serious research has been devoted to this 
question. This paper aims to fill this gap by examining the evidence on the demand for 
university places over the post war period. 
Historically, the participation rate in post-compulsory education and training in 
Great Britain has been low compared with other OECD countries (OECD 1995; Layard 
1995; OECD 2007). In an attempt to acquire a comparative workforce with higher skills 
and more qualifications the UK government implemented successive reforms over the 
last 50 years to expand access to post-compulsory education. Indeed in 2001, the Labour 
Government set a target of 50 per cent of 17 to 30-year-olds participating in HE by 2010 
(Labour Party General Election Manifesto 2001). The aim was also to widen access to 
post-compulsory schooling to students from wider social economic backgrounds with the 
goal of relieving persistent inequalities in the education system. 
To analyze the participation in post-compulsory education and to model the 
demand for higher education (HE), it is important to consider young people’s sequential 
decisions: to stay on at school past the compulsory minimum school leaving age of 16
1, 
to qualify for university entrance and to enter university. Most pupils who do not enter 
training or try to enter the labour market at the age of 16 will stay on in schools or 
colleges of further education, and take the ‘A’ level examinations at the age of 18. Those 
who pass two or more ‘A’ levels will be qualified to enter university in the same year. 
Accordingly we define the post-16 staying on rate,  S , as the proportion of 16-year-old 
age group attending schools and colleges of further education, the qualified leaver rate, 
                                                            
1The school leaving age in England and Wales was 15 before 1972, and was raised from 15 to 16 in 
September 1972. 2 
 
Q, as those qualified leavers with two or more ‘A’ level passes as a proportion of the 
relevant age group, and the university entrance rate,  UE, as the university entrants as a 
percentage of the relevant age group.
2 These relations are logically interconnected and 
ordered recursively in the sense that the staying on rate will inevitably change the 
qualified leaver rate and that the university entrance rate can only rise if both these two 
have risen. Hence it makes sense to study these decisions together and model them in this 
sequential way. 
Figure 1 depicts trends in the staying on rate, qualified leaver rate and university 
entrance rate from 1955 to 2008 for males and females.
3 Clearly, the staying on rate, 
after controlling for the increase of school leaving age in 1972, has been rising steadily 
over the whole period, and increased substantially in the 1980s and 1990s. The qualified 
leaver rate and the university entrance rate are also clearly trended upwards.
4 
A radical expansion of HE required an alternative funding system. For a long time 
after 1945, HE in the UK was provided free of charge as Local Education Authorities 
(LEAs) paid each student’s HE tuition fees. In addition, the Education Act of 1962 
introduced a national Mandatory Awards system for student maintenance grant. However, 
when HE participation increased steadily during the 1980s and 1990s, the total amount of 
necessary funding did not rise in line with the HE expansion and it became untenable to 
subsidize HE. Figure 2 plots the long run trend of student finance over the past half 
century. This time series data, from official ‘Statistics of Education’ and ‘Statistical First 
                                                            
2These variables are defined on the basis of Pissarides' earlier works on post-compulsory education which 
will be discussed in Section 2.2. 
3The variables discussed in this paper mainly refer to England and Wales only. See Section 3.1 for further 
discussion of key variables. 
4It should be noted that our university entrance rate is much lower than official participation indices such as 
the Age Participation Index (API) and the Higher Education Initial Participation Rate (HEIPR) due to 
different definitions. The university entrance rate here is defined as new entrants to first-degree 
undergraduate courses in universities and colleges as a percentage of the relevant age groups. The API and 
the HEIPR is much higher because they cover more higher education institutions. The API measures 
full-time participation by UK-domiciled students, aged below 21 years, in higher education courses in 
Great Britain. (Source: ‘House of Commons Hansard Written Answers for 26 Jan 2006', 
http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200506/cmhansrd/vo060126/text/60126w13.htm, 
last accessed: 1 July 2010.) And the HEIPR counts English-domiciled 17-30 year old Higher Education 
students. Students are counted if they participate for at least six months on a course expected to last for at 
least six months, except that students are not counted if they have participated in Higher Education 
previously for at least six months. Students at FECs in England, Scotland and Wales are counted if they are 
on courses designated as National Vocational Qualification Level 4 or above, or listed as Higher Education. 
(Source: 'Methodological Revisions to the Higher Education Initial Participation Rate', 
http://www.dcsf.gov.uk/rsgateway/DB/SFR/s000714/SFR08-2007.pdf, last accessed: 1 July 2010.) 3 
 
Releases’, shows the steady decline of student funding from 1962 onwards. By the mid 
1990s the average LEA expenditure on maintenance per student had fallen dramatically 
by 42% since 1980. It fell gradually from 1993 and then much more steeply from 1998. 
In response to the HE expansion and the heavy burden this imposed on public 
expenditure, new HE policies were formulated, which shifted part of the financing burden 
from the state to the students and/or their families. In the 1990/91 academic year, 
mortgage-style student loans were first introduced for HE students to partially replace 
grants and provide extra resources towards living expenses up until 1997/98. Then 
following the Dearing Report, a new student finance scheme in HE came into effect in 
1998/99. New entrants to full-time HE courses paid an upfront contribution towards a 
means tested tuition fee up to £1,000 per year. In the same year, means tested 
maintenance student loans (so-called income-contingent loans) were introduced. The 
loans were separated from fees and paid by the government-owned Student Loans 
Company (SLC). Students were expected to repay the loans after they graduated 
according to their income. 
As shown in Figure 2, over the period from 1990 to 2000, the average level of 
maintenance loans continued to rise; ever since then it has remained approximately 
constant.
5  Meanwhile, student grants were gradually reduced and completely phased out 
in 1999/2000: the average level of LEA expenditure on maintenance declined 
dramatically in 1998, and remained relatively low after 2001 until recent years when 
student grants were reintroduced. The new HE Grant was introduced in 2004/05, and a 
means-tested Maintenance Grant of £2,700 was introduced in 2006/07. 
Further reforms took effect in 2006/07 under the Higher Education Act of 2004. 
Variable fees up to £3,000 per year were introduced in England (£1,200 in Wales). 
Up-front fees were removed; government-subsidized fees loans were introduced so that 
tuition fees are deferrable until after graduation. With the rate of fees rising in line with 
inflation, the average level of fees loans has increased at the same time.
6 
This brief history brings us up to date in the sense that this is the system of 
                                                            
5In Figure 2 we put the loan as positive as a loan is considered to facilitate HE participation through the 
provision of short run financial funds. Recipients of student loans typically benefit from a liquidity effect 
and a subsidy effect. Further discussion is provided in Section 3.2.1. 
6Further details of rates of grants and loans since 1962 are set out in Table A1. 4 
 
university finance which will be in operation until September 2012. In 2010 the Browne 
Commission reported and recommended that university fees should rise considerably. 
Since then the government has decided to allow universities to charge up to £9,000 per 
student per year (subject to various conditions regarding access and financial help for 
students from poorer family backgrounds). 
Although it was argued that changes between 2004 and 2007 to funding 
arrangements would provide the policy makers leverage to widen participation, there has 
been increased concern that the impending rise in fees due in 2012 could reverse the 
trend of rising HE participation.
7  So, to what extent do the upward trends in  S ,  Q and 
UE represent an increase in the underlying demand for post-compulsory education, 
rather than short-run dynamic adjustments, demographic changes or structural break 
responses to HE funding policy changes? This paper will address this question over a 
sample period from 1955 to 2008 which saw great variation in HE student support policy. 
It should be noted that our analysis takes as given and unconstrained the supply of 
university places. Our calculations suggest that after 1994 a roughly constant fraction of 
75-80%
8 of applicants to university succeed in getting in and we posit that this is 
consistent with unconstrained supply if we allow for applicants who fail to make their ‘A’ 
level grades or who decide not to go to university or defer entry. In some sense the ‘raw’ 
demand for university places is the total number of young people applying to university. 
However, this number is not the true demand as a sizeable fraction of the applicants 
either do not obtain 2 ‘A’ level passes or the necessary grades for their chosen course. 
These applicants who are unable to go to university by reason of insufficient 
qualifications should not be added into any calculation of the demand for places. 
A future issue is whether any limitation on the supply of places has curtailed 
demand from students who think they will be unable to find a university place. Our 
analysis cannot hope to model this inevitable interaction of potential supply on 
‘discouraged demand’. However we suggest that since supply of university places has 
been relatively unconstrained (specially in terms of LEA maintenance funding to 
                                                            
7There is also concern that students from lower social class backgrounds would be under represented. This 
paper is unable to comment on this aspect of the debate on the demand for HE as participation rates in 
full-time post-compulsory education by social class are not available on a consistent basis over the whole 
time period in question. 
8In Appendix B we provide further details of the available data. 5 
 
individual students up to 1999)
9  then this will not detract from our analysis. 
An issue in estimating the causal effect of the HE finance policies on the demand 
for post-compulsory education in a time-series framework is that, throughout the time 
period in question, in addition to the changes in HE finance described above, there has 
been a sequence of other policy changes that might have had important impacts on the 
participation rates as well as other key variables. For instance, the raising of school 
leaving age (ROSLA) was introduced in 1972 when the legal age a child is allowed to 
leave compulsory education increased to 16. In subsequent years the post-16 staying on 
rate is observed to increase. In 1988, the dual system of O-Levels (sat by grammar school 
children) and CSE exams (sat by secondary modern school children) in the UK were 
abolished and replaced by a new system, GCSE, for 16 year olds. This unified exam put 
all children on the same scale, with a range of seven grades from A to G. The 
introduction of GCSE resulted in the proportion of the cohort achieving five or more 
GCSEs at grade C or above (or the equivalent of this prior to 1988) increasing 
substantially as Figure A3 shows. And this appears to correspond to a significant upward 
shift in the trend of the qualified leaver rate and the university entrance rate as reflected 
in Figure 1. In addition, the Education Maintenance Allowance (EMA), which is 
available to 16 to 19 year olds, was rolled out nationally in 2004. The new financial 
scheme might also be linked to shifts in the staying on rate. 
All these important policy changes are summarized as a timeline in Figure 3. Are 
these policy changes linked to structural changes, i.e., statistically robust shifts in means 
and trends, in the demand for post-compulsory education and other key variables, and in 
the multi-equation system we are going to examine? If some changes did occur to these 
variables, then the traditional unit root tests are likely to be biased towards the 
nonrejection of the unit root null and will lead to false test results. Moreover, in the 
presence of structural changes in a multi-equation system, it is crucial to detect and 
estimate the nature and timing of these breaks so as to obtain robust estimation results. 
Although the examination of structural breaks is commonplace in time-series analysis,
10 
                                                            
9Any student who obtained a university place prior to 1999 was automatically guaranteed a maintenance 
grant from their Local Education Authority. 
10The seminal paper is the work by Perron (1989) who examines the testing for the unit root null hypothesis 
in a framework allowing for a one-time change in the level or in the slope of the trend function. The paper 6 
 
it has not yet been used in examining the demand for post-compulsory education. A 
major contribution of this paper lies in making allowance for changes in the shocks. 
Specifically, we will account for structural shifts in dependent variables and regressors 
when running unit root tests, and apply an approach developed by Qu and Perron (2007) 
to deal with structural changes in a system of regressions which models the simultaneous 
determination of  S ,  Q and UE .
11 Such a framework allows discrete changes in HE 
and funding, and models these changes as exogenous events. In addition, it explicitly 
assesses the effect of changing costs on the demand for HE. 
The purpose of this article is to analyze discrete changes in the HE funding policy 
to identify the causal impact of the grants, loans, and tuition fees regime changes on the 
demand for HE in a time-series framework where allowance is made for the structural 
changes we have discussed. We incorporate these structural changes into a model of the 
determination  S ,  Q and UE, using time-series data for England and Wales over the 
period 1955 to 2008. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
provides a brief review of the existing empirical work on the demand for 
post-compulsory education and HE participation. Section 3 describes the data and 
discusses the stationarity of data. As our approach of testing and estimating the break 
changes builds upon Qu and Perron’s recently developed theoretical framework, this is 
outlined in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the empirical results. Proceeding on the basis of 
these empirical results, Section 6 presents a policy simulation of a potential upcoming 
reform which is to lift the level of tuition fees. Section 7 concludes. 
2.  Existing Evidence on the Demand for Post-compulsory Education 
and HE Participation 
2.1. HE Finance and HE Participation 
There is a lot of evidence from the US on the relationship between HE finance and HE 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
has induced many empirical studies in this area, for instance, by Christiano (1992), Zivot and Andrews 
(1992), Ben-David and Papell (1995), Corman and Mocan (2000), Hansen (2001) , Bekaert et al. (2002), 
and Fisher (2006). 
11The Qu and Perron approach has been applied in financial economics by Bataa et al. (2009) and Roine 
and Waldenstrom (2009). 7 
 
participation. Some of these studies are facilitated by a variety of changes in State or 
federal financial policies in post-secondary education. The implications of changing 
educational finance policies on the demand for post-secondary education have been 
extensively researched, with significant contributions by Kane (1994), Keane and Wolpin 
(1997), Heckman et al. (1998), Cameron and Heckman (2001), Dynarski (2002), 
Carneiro and Heckman (2002), Dynarski (2003a), Avery and Hoxby (2004), and Epple et 
al. (2006). There is less evidence from the UK but there have been a number of attempts 
to evaluate the effects of changing tuition fees and student financial support. 
Blanden and Machin (2004) study temporal shifts in HE participation and 
attainment of children from different parental income groups. They make use of 
longitudinal data from three time periods (NCDS -- the National Child Development 
Study, BCS -- the British Cohort Study, and BHPS -- the British Household Panel Survey) 
to address this question over the period from the early 1970s to the late 1990s, when the 
UK HE experienced a rapid expansion and the HE financial policy gradually became less 
generous to students. They find a growing imbalance in access to HE by income group as 
HE expanded, that is, the participation gap was widened between rich and poor children. 
Galindo-Rueda  et al. (2004) examine the relationship between the HE 
participation and their estimated mean neighbourhood income over a more recent period, 
from 1994 to 2001. To do this they construct a postcode level data by matching a Higher 
Education Statistics Agency (HESA) data to household income data and the 2001 Census. 
The results indicate that richer postcodes experienced a more rapid increase in HE 
participation as compared with poorer neighbourhoods, particularly in the early and mid 
1990s. This positive relationship disappeared after the introduction of tuition fees, 
however. They then use the Youth Cohort Study (YCS) data to identify the determinants 
of HE participation. The micro-analysis compares Cohort 7 of YCS data consisting of 
young individuals who were 18 in 1996 (i.e. before the introduction of tuition fees) with 
Cohort 9 consisting of those who were 18 in 2000 (i.e. after the introduction of tuition 
fees). The results provide some evidence of the impact of low socio-economic 
background on the lower probability of participating in HE over the period. 
Dearden  et al. (2008) provide an analysis of the HE student finance reforms 
introduced by the Higher Education Act of 2004. They exploit the distributional effects of 8 
 
the reforms in two dimensions: how individuals are affected by their parental income and 
their simulated graduate lifetime earnings. They find that there has been a significant 
reduction in HE costs over the lifecycle for students from low income families, and an 
increase in the costs for those from middle and upper income families. The paper 
provides some empirical support for income-contingent student loans. Specifically, the 
net present value of loan repayment is found to increase with graduate lifetime earnings, 
while both the loans subsidy (expressed as a proportion of the face value of the loan) and 
the time for repayment are decreasing in lifetime earnings. 
In a more recent study based on the cross-sectional Labour Force Survey (LFS) 
data from 1992 to 2007, Dearden et al. (2010) analyze the separate effects of up-front 
fees and student support on university participation. Their analysis, based on a 
pseudo-panel approach, finds a significant negative impact of up-front fees on university 
participation, and positive effects of loans and grants. Specifically, a £1,000 increase in 
fees reduces degree participation by 4.4 percentage points, while the same amount of 
increase in loans increases participation by 3.2 percentage points, and the same amount of 
increase in maintenance grants raises participation by 2.1 percentage points. 
2.2. Time-series Studies on the Demand for UK Post-compulsory Education 
Most of the existing research on the demand for HE is based on cross-section or panel 
data. It is difficult to identify the underlying relationship between the cost of HE and the 
demand for HE if all young people face the same fees and tuition costs at a given point in 
time. The alternative is to collate long run time-series data over the whole post war period 
to attempt to identify regime changes in HE funding when examining the variation in 
participation rates over time. Modelling long run time series data of aggregate variables 
relating to the education system is inherently problematic as these data are usually 
trended and predominantly influenced by legislative or structural change and institutional 
reform. This means that the data are invariably non-stationary and difficult to model 
without investigating the timing of these structural changes explicitly. This is what we do 
in this paper. 
Looking at the literature, it is apparent that relatively few time-series studies have 
investigated the HE funding regime changes, although there has been a literature of 9 
 
time-series econometric studies on post-compulsory education choices of young people. 
The UK literature is mostly concerned with the post-compulsory education choice of 
young people at the age of 16 and examines the determinants of participation rates.
12 
Pissarides (1981) models the staying on rate between 1955 and 1978, and 
concludes that variations in the proportion of 16-year-olds attending post-compulsory 
education were mainly driven by changes in household permanent income and 
movements of relative earnings between manual workers and highly qualified workers. In 
a second paper by the same author, Pissarides (1982) presents another time-series 
analysis to examine the transition from school to university. In addition to the 
determinants of the staying on rates, the paper investigates the determinants of proportion 
of 18-year-old age group qualifying for university entrance, and the determinants of the 
proportion of the age cohort entering university for the first time. The result suggests that 
the school staying on rate is mainly driven by the relative present values, per-capita 
consumption and the unemployment rate. The major determinants of qualified leaver rate 
are the school staying on rate (two years earlier), the real permanent income (two year 
earlier), and the ratio of the present value of earnings of early school leavers to that of 
university graduates (one year earlier). And the qualified leaver rate is a good indicator of 
variations in the demand for university places. 
Whitfield and Wilson (1991) re-estimate the Pissarides (1981) model over a 
longer period from 1955 to 1986 and find that the model specification becomes 
inadequate when applied to this later time period. They then extend Pissarides’ work by 
adopting dynamic specifications, applying vector auto-regression techniques, and 
including additional explanatory variables to take account of changing social class 
structure, the rate of return to schooling and the level of unemployment in the youth 
labour market. Their results suggest that these variables play a key role in determining 
the decision of whether to pursue post-compulsory education. 
McIntosh (2001) presents an international comparison of the determinants of 
participation rates in post-compulsory education, comparing England and Wales, 
Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. The investigation examines data within a 
                                                            
12The US literature also provides time-series analysis of college enrolments, such as Mattila (1982), and 
McPherson and Shapiro (1991). 10 
 
cointegration framework and applies the Engle-Granger two-step estimation procedure. 
McVicar and Rice (2001) adopt cointegration analysis to an extended period from 1955 
to 1994. Both papers provide time-series analyses regarding how the public policy 
interventions have affected young people’s decisions of post-compulsory education. Both 
papers suggest a key variable to measure the prior academic performance: the proportion 
of the relevant age cohort achieving five or more grade A*-C Olevel/CSE/GCSE. This is 
concerned with the introduction of GCSE examination in England and Wales in 1988 
which is followed by an upward shift in examination results, as reflected in Figure A3. 
McIntosh argues that the growth of participation is attributable largely to GCSE 
attainment. Other key variables are the real income and the relative wage between 
professional workers and manual workers. The level of youth unemployment seems to 
play only a small role in determining whether to stay on at school. These results are 
partially confirmed by Rice and McVicar who find a significant role for GCSE 
attainment and the expansion of the HE sector (as measured by the proportion of 18 and 
19 year olds going on to HE in the relevant year) in influencing the participation decision 
of 16-year-olds. Other important factors include changes in unemployment and the ratio 
of professional earnings to manual earnings. 
The most recent study relating to the UK is the paper by Clark (2009), who 
assesses the determinants of the enrolment in post-compulsory education in England. His 
analysis focuses on the impact of local labour market conditions (mainly proxied by 
youth unemployment and adult unemployment) and labour market expectations. The 
paper uses a regional panel data over the period from 1975 to 2005. Overall the empirical 
results are robust to the addition and exclusion of control variables, and indicate strong 
positive effects of youth unemployment and GCSE exam achievement, especially for 
girls. These estimates are used to decompose enrolment across two periods when the 
enrolment grew rapidly and another two periods when the enrolment was relatively stable. 
He then aggregates the data to national level and estimates time series models. Without 
other controls, the estimate of the youth unemployment has a strong and positive effect 
on enrolment. However, this effect is sensitive to model specification: with other control 
variables added to the model, the magnitude of the youth unemployment coefficient 
becomes smaller in boys’ enrolment model, and the sign of coefficients for girls’ model 11 
 
is even reversed. 
These papers have presented a consistent framework highlighting the 
post-compulsory education choice of young people, but either predate the policy changes 
in HE finance, or have not presented evidence of the regime changes in question. As for 
methodologies, the earlier papers predate the commonplace concern with stationarity of 
the stochastic time series variables. Stationarity is first discussed by Whitfield and 
Wilson (1991), and all the following papers investigate stationarity but do not consider 
the changing cost of HE or allow for any structural change in any variable, which might 
lead to spurious results. In addition, the modelled relationships in these works treat the 
break dates as known, without performing the relevant tests. Specifically early works use 
step dummy variables to capture important regime changes, and Clark (2009) 
decomposes the sample on the basis of growth in enrolment. This is problematic since if a 
break date is chosen as known, then this choice cannot be treated as exogenous. In 
essence any break point chosen by eye balling the data is still arbitrary. 
To solve these problems, we first use unit root tests allowing for structural 
changes. Then our analysis adopts methodological developments presented in Qu and 
Perron (2007) to take account of the regime changes in post-compulsory education 
policies. The framework developed by Qu and Perron, whereby the break dates are 
treated as unknown a priori, allows us to estimate these structural break dates 
exogenously, i.e., without imposing prior notions about their existence, number or timing, 
and then test for their validity.   
Clearly one cannot really study the demand for HE without examining the 
determinants of school staying on rates and exam performance. In line with demographic 
constraints, university entrance rate can only rise if staying-on rate rises and then 
qualified leaver rate increases. To do this we use the Seemingly Unrelated Regressions 
(SUR) model proposed by Zellner (1962) to estimate of a system of equations of the 
post-16 staying on rate, the qualified leaver rate, and the university entrance rate. SUR 
allows us to estimate multiple equations simultaneously while accounting for the 
correlated errors due to the fact that the models involve the same observations. This leads 
to efficient estimates of the coefficients and standard errors. 12 
 
3.  Data 
This paper uses time series data from 1955 thorough to 2008 to model the role of 
different factors in driving the demand for post-compulsory education in the UK. The 
time-series data is collected from, or calculated on the basis of, various data sources 
which are detailed in the Data Appendix (Appendix A). The data used relate to England 
and Wales, and the variables are derived separately for male and female subsamples to 
facilitate gender comparisons. 
3.1. Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables for our estimation in the following sections are the staying on 
rate (S ), the qualified leaver rate (Q), and the university entrance rate (UE). Following 
Pissarides (1981 and 1982), we define as the proportion of the age cohort attending 
full-time education in schools
13 and colleges of further education. The 16-year-old age 
group consists of people aged 16 on 1 January, and who are above the minimum school 
leaving age in September of the same academic year. Therefore in our data, prior to 
1972/73, when the minimum school leaving age was set at 15, the age group is composed 
of all the 16-year-olds. And the staying on population consists of the number of 
16-year-old pupils attending full-time education in schools and major further education 
establishments. In academic year 1972/73, the minimum school leaving age was raised to 
16, and the staying on rates in subsequent years are defined as the 16-year-old age group 
above the minimum school-leaving age attending full-time education in schools. In other 
words, only those born between 1 January and 1 September are included in the data for 
these years.
14 It should be noted that, due to the change in the definition of relevant age 
group for calculating  S  since 1972/73, the average age of the defined ‘16-year-olds’ is 
higher after 1972/73 than that of the age cohort in previous years. And there turns out to 
be an obvious downward shift in in 1972/73, as shown in Figure 1. 
                                                            
13Including schools maintained by LEA, direct grant schools and independent schools. 
14However, for academic years 1972/73 to 1978/79, the statistical records only provide relevant data 
defined on the age at the beginning of calendar year (i.e. January in a specific academic year). Following 
Pissarides (1981 and 1982), the denominator was taken to be two-thirds of the entire age group in the 
calculations of S for these years, by the assumption of a uniform birth distribution. No such adjustment was 
necessary for the data in subsequent years when the relevant data are defined on ages at the beginning of 
the academic year. 13 
 
To analyze the HE student finance we focus on those school leavers who are 
qualified to enter university and those who actually enter university, as HE financial 
arrangements relate to entrants to HE. We define  Q  as those qualified leavers (with two 
or more ‘A’ level passes) as a proportion of 18-year-olds, and  UE the home university 
entrants as a percentage of 18-year-olds. 
3.2. Independent Variables 
The first group of variables are assumed to directly influence the demand for 
post-compulsory education. The academic attainment before the end of compulsory 
education is expected to exert an essential impact on S . The measure of average 
academic attainment could be represented by the proportion of the group achieving five 
or more GCSEs at grade C or above, or the equivalent of this prior to 1988. Variations in 
Q, the proportion of 18-year-olds qualified to enter universities, are partially driven by 
the staying on rate of 16-year-olds two years earlier, and subsequent changes in Q 
should lead to changes in  UE  in the same year. 
As discussed in Section 2, several cross-sectional analyses have focused on the 
relationship between HE participation and family background (such as parental income 
and socio-economic status). In our time-series analysis we use alternative aggregate 
variables such as the social class and consumption expenditure to capture the 
consumption value of education. Specifically, social class is represented by the 
proportion of employees in the UK working in professional and scientific services and 
public administration, and the level of per-capita consumer expenditure in real terms is 
used as an indicator of average consumption expenditure.
15 
The probability of current unemployment or the expectation of future 
unemployment should have an impact on the demand for education. For early school 
leavers the ideal indicator of labour market conditions is youth unemployment, i.e., the 
unemployment rate of young people aged under 20. Due to data limitations in earlier 
statistical records, we define the youth unemployment as the number of 18-19 year old 
unemployed as a percentage of the number of employees (i.e. employees in employment 
plus the unemployment) of the age cohort. The time-series pattern of youth 
                                                            
15All monetary variables in this study are measured in real terms (at 2006 prices). 14 
 
unemployment rate is depicted in Figure A5(i). Alternatively we also use adult 
unemployment to represent the current demand conditions that the 16-year-olds are faced 
with in the labour market. The variable is graphed in Figure A5(ii). And either of youth 
unemployment or adult unemployment enters the  S  equation as an indicator of labour 
market condition that early school leavers are faced with. In this sense the staying on rate 
should increase with the unemployment rate. 
In addition, we include in the model the unemployment rate of new university 
graduates which is assumed to be related to Q  and UE . The pattern of graduate 
unemployment is shown in Figure A5(iii). The potential effect of graduate unemployment 
is somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, the variation in undergraduate unemployment 
will influence the 18-year-olds’ expectation of future employability, and should thus 
induce a negative effect on the demand for education. The magnitude of this effect should 
depend on the extent to which young people treat it as an indicator of future labour 
market conditions. On the other hand, the graduate unemployment is related to the youth 
unemployment and adult unemployment, and therefore also reflects the possibility of 
being currently employed. In this respect it may exert a positive effect on the demand for 
education. Nevertheless it is of interest to examine the influence of undergraduate 
unemployment in the following analysis. 
Several other factors have been identified as important determinants of the 
demand for HE. The expected rate of return to additional schooling should be 
incorporated to the model. This could be represented in the form of the internal rate of 
return (IRR) to undertaking a graduate job. The variable is constructed on the basis of 
LFS and New Earnings Survey (NES), and Wilson (1980, 1983 and 1985)’s estimates for 
earlier years. The methodology for calculating follows Ziderman (1973), Wilson (1980, 
1983 and 1985) and Dolton and Chung (2004). Details can be found in Appendix C. 
Figure A6 graphs our estimates of the  IRR  over the duration of our sample years. 
And finally, our focus will be on the effect of regime changes in HE finance policies. We 
now discuss our financial variables in details. 
3.2.1  Average Net College Costs 
A large volume of evidence suggests that higher net average college costs drive 15 
 
university enrolment rates downward. In the traditional approach, student loans are 
excluded and treated simply as a mechanism through which students delay paying for 
fees, and students are assumed to respond to a single net price, i.e., tuition costs minus 
grants. This approach is challenged by St. John and Starkey (1995), who suggest an 
alternative approach which assumes that students respond to a set of prices and subsidies. 
In our study, student loans will be included as a factor influencing average net college 
costs. However, no distinction can be made in the data among the effect of tuition fees, 
student grants and student loans due to the inherent nature of the time-series data. 
Therefore we focus on the derivation and computation of an average cost of HE to the 
students instead, in order to assess the impact of changing costs on demand for HE. As 
summarized in Section 1, the student loans scheme was implemented in the early 1990s, 
and no fees were charged to university students until the late 1990s. Hence we construct a 
net cost variable from a combination of all the data on tuition fees, student grants and 
student loans. As a matter of fact, a combination of these financial variables contributes 
to explicitly testing how students react to a change in net costs resulting from different 
but fundamentally similar reforms. 
Tuition fees represent an important form of direct college costs.
16 The rate of 
tuition fees charged to university entrants is the best measure of the direct cost of HE to 
the prospective student. This is because we are examining a young person’s demand for 
university education, and it is necessary to associate a representative average direct cost 
of HE participation to each individual who may be a prospective participant. One can 
reasonably expect that a higher rate of tuition fees will affect young people’s willingness 
to undertake university study and therefore deter HE participation.
17 
Demand for university study might be expected to increase, the higher is the 
direct subsidy which is available to students. We use the average LEA expenditure on 
maintenance awards per student to approximate the average level of student grants or the 
average subsidy to each student.
18 
                                                            
16Although university students also incur other cost of attendance such as books and accommodation, we 
ignore these factors due to lack of a consistent series of data. 
17For recent years when variable tuition fees were charged, we use the cap of tuition fees to proxy the rate 
of fees as most of the institutions actually charged the maximum of fees. 
18One measure of the volume of average student grants will be obtained by multiplying the proportion of 
full-time new university entrants by the average amount received, but such a series does not exist in the 16 
 
A different form of financial aid, namely the student loan, has been found to 
modestly increase college attendance. However, the interpretation of student loans is 
somewhat complicated, as a loan facilitates HE participation through the provision of 
short run financial funds but nevertheless -- since this is a loan which has to be repaid 
then one would expect, vis-a-vis a comparison with a system of grants or subsidies, that a 
loan system would discourage HE participation. Recipients of student loans typically 
benefit in two ways: a liquidity effect and a subsidy effect. In fact, given that student 
loans are not restricted to those who are credit constrained, the liquidity effect is 
dominated by the subsidies provided in the form of below market interest rate charges 
and government payment of interest during the recipient students’ university study. 
Therefore for simplicity we will only consider the subsidy value of student loans when 
comparing its effect with other forms of student supports. If we assume that students are 
rational economic agents, they will react differently to student grants and student loans. 
Subsidized loans should in theory yield a smaller effect than student grants at the same 
face value. The subsidy value of student loans is normally assumed to be anywhere from 
zero to about 50 percent of the face value. For instance, in studies by Clotfelter et al. 
(1991), McPherson and Schapiro (1991), Feldstein (1995), student loans are assumed to 
provide a subsidy value of half of the face value. Kane (1995) and Dynarski (2003b) put 
the subsidy value at approximately one-third of the value. Epple et al. (2006) put the 
implicit subsidy at 25% of the dollar value. Furthermore, as student loans are provided 
for both maintenance and tuition fees in recent years, it is a good practice to apply 
specific weights separately to the average maintenance loan subsidy and the average fee 
loan subsidy. According to DfES projections, the weights are 21% and 33% for 
maintenance loans and fee loans, respectively.
19  In practice these weights will be applied 
to average maintenance loans and fees loans per student. The weighted sum is used to 
approximate the average student loans. Therefore the following analysis will apply a 
range of values: loans valued at one quarter, one-third and one-half of the face value, 
together with a weighted sum of maintenance loans and fee loans. 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
statistical record. 
19Source: Hansard, 10 November 2005. 'Education finance', 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldhansrd/vo051110/text/51110-25.htm (last accessed: 1 
July 2010) 17 
 
Figure A7 presents the series of student finance elements on the basis of different 
definitions of student loans discussed above. The average net college cost (COSTt ) is 
then calculated as a weighted sum of the fees ( feet ), grants (grantt ), maintenance loans 
(mloant) and fee loans ( floant), namely rate of fees minus the face value of grants and 
the subsidy value of loans. Take the fourth definition of loans as an example: 
COSTt = feet − grantt −(0.21mloant +0.33floant). The net cost variable calculated in 
this way may take negative values for some years. Therefore we measure these financial 
variables in thousands of real pounds (expressed at 2006 prices) rather than in natural 
logs. 
3.3. Unit Root Tests Allowing for Structural Changes 
Natural log transformations are taken for all variables except the net college costs. To 
circumvent the possibility that our regression analysis may give rise to spurious 
relationships, we carry out Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests to check the 
stationarity of each variable. A well known weakness of the Dickey-Fuller style unit root 
test is its inability to account for structural changes of the variable itself. In fact in the 
presence of structural shifts, the test will be biased towards the nonrejection of the unit 
root null. It is particularly crucial to take account of structural changes in our unit root 
analysis, since most of the series of variables in study appear to exhibit some sort of 
structural changes; these structural changes are evident by even a casual examination of 
the time series plots of  S ,  Q and UE as in Figure 1 and the plot of GCSE results in 
Figure A3. To overcome this complication, we then perform alternative unit root tests 
allowing for structural changes, namely Zivot-Andrews (1992) and 
Clemente-Montanes-Reyes (1998) tests, as robustness checks for the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller tests. Our test statistics are reported in Tables A2-A4 and details are 
discussed in Appendix D. These results confirm that all the stochastic variables are  I(1). 
This suggests that we use first-differenced variables in our analysis. 
4.  Methodology 
4.1. An SUR Model of HE Demand 18 
 
We include in the SUR model the expected gain from a university degree (IRR), coupled 
with two groups of variables to capture the consumption value of education (Cons) as 
measured by either consumer expenditure (C ) or social class demographic change 
(CLASS ) respectively. The consumption value of education is included in all the three 
equations of  S ,  Q and UE, and  IRR  is assumed to influence the university entrance 
rate. 
The impact of local labour markets is represented by adult unemployment or 
youth unemployment, with one-year lag ( 1 − t U  or  1 − t YU  respectively) in the equation, 
and the graduate unemployment ( 1 − t GU ) enters both of the Q and UE  equations. 
Other variables do not vary across models. We measure the impact of average academic 
attainment (GCSE ) in the  S  equation, S  with two-year lag in the  Q equation, and 
finally  Q in  the UE equation. 
In summary, we estimate models of the form, for males and females respectively: 
    t t j t j t j j t Cons Unemp GCSE S μ α α α α + Δ + Δ + Δ + = Δ − ln ln ln ln , 3 1 , 2 , 1 , 0      (1) 
t t j t j t j j t S Cons GU Q υ β β β β + Δ + Δ + Δ + = Δ − − 2 , 3 , 2 1 , 1 , 0 ln ln ln ln          (2) 
t t j t j
t j t j t j j t
Q COST
IRR Cons GU UE
ε γ γ
γ γ γ γ
+ Δ + Δ +
Δ + Δ + Δ + = Δ − −
ln ln
ln ln ln ln
, 5 , 4
1 , 3 , 2 1 , 1 , 0
           (3) 
Where j indicates regimes, Unemp is represented by U or  YU  in different 
model specifications, and  Cons by C  or CLASS   in different settings. Specifically we 
estimated models which used the adult unemployment rate and consumption (Model I), 
the adult unemployment rate and social class (Model II), the youth unemployment rate 
and social class (Model III) and the youth unemployment rate and consumption (Model 
IV). 
Two features of this model should be noted. Firstly, as explained in Section 4.2, 
the methodology of estimating structural changes rules out unit root regressors. Since we 
are constrained to model in variable differences (due to the fact that all our variables are 
) 1 ( I  in their level form), then we are inevitably modelling the short-run relationship 
between our educational demand variables and their determinants. Secondly, in the 
specifications of our equations we are constrained by the logical recursive time structure 19 
 
of the university process. Specifically, since GCSE’s, which determine  S , are sat two 
years before ‘A’ levels, this means that  St−2  is the appropriate regressor in equation (2). 
Likewise ‘A’ levels are sat in the same year that university entrance takes place, so  Qt 
(unlagged) is the appropriate form in equation (3). Also since each year in the time series 
data relates to a separate cohort of 18 year olds then there is little scope for any dynamic 
determinants in the specification. It is for these reasons that we do not employ any error 
correction model (by including lagged dependant variables in the models). Therefore 
more flexible dynamic modelling is precluded. We realise that this may be considered a 
shortcoming of model specification; but given that our main interest is in the short-run 
effect of average net college cost on  UE, we think this model captures the focus of this 
paper, which is that we wish to determine the likely short-run impact of the immediate 
increase in fees to £9,000. 
4.2. Estimation of Structural Changes in a System of Regressions 
We turn next to the structural changes in our HE demand model. Our multivariate 
analysis builds upon methodological developments of estimation and testing in the 
context of structural changes. A ‘structural change’ is defined as an abrupt change in the 
structure of the modelled relation, with statistically significant and lasting shifts in the 
parameters of the conditional mean, the variance of the error term, or both. In a pure 
structural change model the structural change could occur to all coefficients, while in a 
partial structural change model only part of the coefficients are different in different 
regimes. 
The development of estimating multiple structural changes simultaneously in a 
system of regressions is relatively recent. Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) provide a 
comprehensive treatment of various issues in the context of multiple structural change 
models, such as tests for structural changes, methods to select the number of breaks, and 
efficient algorithms to compute the estimates. 
Qu and Perron (2007) provide a general framework that permits various more 
complex models including SUR. Using their method, we regress the three equations SUR 
model in the form of 
t j t t u S z I y + ⊗ =
′ β ) (                                             ( 4 )  20 
 
In this equation, the subscript  t  indexes a temporal observation  ) ,..., 1 ( T t = , and 
j  a regime  ) 1 ,..., 1 ( + = m j  where m  is the total number of structural changes in the 
system and  M m ≤ , the pre-specified maximum number of breaks.  t y  denotes an n
-vector of dependent variables representing the post-war trend of participation rates (in 
our model  3 = n ),  I  an  n n×  identity matrix,  ) ,..., ( 1 ′ = qt t t z z z  a  q -vector that 
includes the regressors from all equations,  S  a selection matrix that specifies which 
regressors in  t z   enter in each equation,  j β  a vector estimated coefficients in the  j th
regime  j j T t T ≤ ≤ + − 1 1 . The error term  t u has mean 0 and covariance matrix  j Σ  for 
the  j th  regime. By assumption Qu and Perron (2007) rule out unit root regressors. 
Since our unit root tests show that almost all of the variables are  ) 1 ( I , the first-difference 
of the variables are used in the following model settings to ensure all the regressors are 
stationary, i.e.  ) 0 ( I . Qu and Perron’s results are asymptotic in nature, and as such we 
must acknowledge that with our relatively small sample size this is a clear limitation of 
our analysis. Therefore it is necessary to evaluate the quality of the approximations, 
which will be addressed in our future research on the basis of newly developed 
methodologies. 
We then use the procedure suggested by Qu and Perron to determine the presence, 
number and timing of structural changes in the regression coefficients.
20 In short, the 
double maximum statistic is used to test the null of no breaks versus the alternative 
hypothesis of  M m ≤   breaks. If the double maximum test rejects the null of no breaks, a 
sequential  F -type test, based on the estimates of the break dates obtained from a global 
maximization of the likelihood function, is then performed to test the null of  l  breaks 
against the possibility of  1 + l  breaks and determine the number of breaks and their 
locations. The procedure conducts a one break test for each of the  1 + l  segments 
defined by the partition and adds one break each time the test is significant. Throughout 
the procedure, a trimming value is pre-specified to impose a minimal length for each 
                                                            
20Qu and Perron provide tests that allow for changes occurring in the coefficients of the conditional mean 
(pure structural change model in the conditional mean), or changes occurring in the variance of the error 
term (pure structural change model in the covariance matrix), or changes occurring simultaneously in both 
(complete pure structural change model). In our analysis, we will concentrate on the first case. 21 
 
regime.
21  Finally, the estimated break dates are defined in the SUR model, and intercept 
and trend coefficients are estimated.
22 
5.  Results 
In this section we present the empirical results. The system to be analyzed 
consists of stochastic variables as discussed in Section 4.1. As we have detailed in 
Section 3.2.1, different weights are assigned to student loans to represent part of the 
college costs, corresponding to four definitions of net college costs. We estimate a series 
of models with each of these definitions of college costs but the same settings of other 
variables. Preliminary estimates indicate that the different definitions of college costs do 
not change results significantly. Therefore in the following analysis we only report the 
results of models with the fourth definition of college costs, i.e., the weights are 21% and 
33% for maintenance loan and fee loan, respectively. The corresponding variable (COST ) 
is entered in the  UE  regression. 
We estimated models which used the adult unemployment rate and consumption 
(Model I), the adult unemployment rate and social class (Model II), the youth 
unemployment rate and social class (Model III) and the youth unemployment rate and 
consumption (Model IV). Since qualitatively the results are similar we omit all but the 
last results (Model IV) and relegate the other specifications to the Appendix (Tables 
A5-A7). Table 1 reports the estimation results associated with the preferred model 
specifications. The estimated coefficients are reported together with their standard errors. 
In what follows, we first show the structural change test results. One of our primary 
interests is whether the net average college costs drive participation in further education 
for both males and females, so subsequently we discuss in details the estimated effects of 
college costs on  UE. Finally the estimates of other variables in the models are reported. 
5.1. Structural Break Points 
Our starting point is to discuss the break points. These are documented in the first column 
of Table 1. We can see for males the break points are estimated as 1971 and 1991. Hence 
                                                            
21For details the reader is referred to Bai and Perron (1998, 2003), Perron (2005) and Qu and Perron (2007). 
22The tests were performed using the GAUSS code provided by Qu and Perron. Then we used STATA to 
do the inference conditioning on the estimated break dates and fit the model. 22 
 
the estimated coefficients on the regressors are split into three periods: 1958-1970, 
1971-1991 and 1992-2008. These are reported in the first three rows of the table. 
Correspondingly, in the second panel relating to females the estimated break points are 
1973 and 1991 with the estimated parameters set out in the second panel set of three rows. 
Along with the structural break points we report the 95% critical intervals as detected by 
the Qu and Perron (2007) procedure. Interestingly, most of the structural breaks are found 
to have occurred in either early 1970s, or between late 1980s and early 1990s, especially 
for the female cohort. These break points correspond to the raising of school leaving age 
in 1972, the introduction of GCSE exams system in 1988, the introduction of student 
loans in 1990, and the scrapping of student grants initiated from early 1990s. This 
suggests that these policy changes are most closely associated with the structural breaks 
in the model. It should be noted that most of the confidence intervals are relatively loose 
and larger than four years, indicative of gradual changes over a longer time period rather 
than abrupt structural shifts in these cases. 
The tests haven’t detected break points associated with the introduction of tuition 
fees, due to the sample size and our specification of the trimming value for a minimal 
length for each regime. The trimming value is an essential parameter which must be 
pre-specified in the estimation. There is a trade-off when deciding an appropriate 
minimum length for the regime. If we define a minimum length that is too large, we 
might miss some potential break points, while an overly short minimum length will 
probably lead to misleadingly detecting a short-run adjustment as a structural change. In 
practice we use a trial-and-error procedure to decide a minimum length. As a result, a 
minimum length of approximately one quarter of the sample size is used, although it is 
slightly different in different model specifications. Over the period in our sample, it has 
been only one decade since the tuition fees were introduced, therefore we do not have 
enough data to observe these events on data break points. Nevertheless it would be of 
interest to perform the tests again in the future when we obtain a larger number of 
observations. 
5.2. The Role of Net College Costs 
Our estimation outcomes do lend credence to the view that the less generous student 23 
 
support arrangement deters HE participation. Specifically, the results suggest a clear 
negative relationship between the net college costs and university entrance rates for both 
males and females, as has been found in many studies based on individual data, 
especially in the US literature. Moreover, among the samples split by the estimated break 
dates, the most recent periods always exhibit significantly negative effects of college 
costs.
23  The parameter estimates for males and females are broadly comparable in terms 
of signs, although it appears that the magnitude is always larger for males (-0.107 as 
opposed to -0.063 in our preferred model setting as shown in Table 1). In Section 6 we 
will proceed to discuss the marginal effect of tuition fees and provide a policy simulation 
of increasing tuition fees on the basis of the estimated coefficients. 
5.3. Other Results 
The regression results suggest that the post-16 staying on rate is primarily driven by the 
average academic attainment measured by exam results in GCSE (or equivalent prior to 
1988). This effect is especially significant and higher for the period around the 
replacement of O-levels with GCSE. This is supported by earlier findings (McIntosh, 
2001; Rice and McVicar, 2001) that the improvement in GCSE attainment levels since 
the late 1980s has contributed greatly to the rapid growth in participation rates. 
In turn, the staying on rate is found to exert a significant positive effect on the 
qualified leaver rate, and the latter plays a significant role in determining the movements 
of university entrance rate. This is consistent with the results from Pissarides (1982). 
Of the labour market variables, the staying on rate increases with the adult 
unemployment or youth unemployment, as expected. The unemployment rate in the 
equation represents the probability of employment for early school leavers, so an increase 
in it will induce a higher demand for education. However, the interpretation of the impact 
of graduate unemployment remains unclear in the  Q and UE  equations. In most cases 
graduate unemployment exerts significant positive effects on both of the qualified leaver 
rate and the university entrance rate for pre-1970 period for both boys and girls. For the 
female cohort, the variable appears to be negatively related to university entrance rate 
                                                            
23This does not mean that similar results could necessarily be obtained using the last sample period of data 
only. As a matter of fact, estimation on the last sample period yields very different results, which suggests 
that we do need the whole sample period of data to obtain the estimation results reported here. 24 
 
between the early 1970s and late 1980s (or early 1990s). This result indicates that the 
expectation of future employability did not play a consistent role in the determination of 
the demand for HE. An alternative explanation is that the graduate unemployment is 
tracked by the adult unemployment, and the adult unemployment is picking up the 
long-run relationship determining the demand for HE and offsets the negative effect of 
graduate unemployment. 
The average consumption expenditure is not significant in all the models. And the 
effects of socio-economic social class variable are ambiguous or negligible. It exerts a 
positive effect on post-16 staying on rate since 1988, has a negative effect on qualified 
leaver rate before 1988, but does not enter the  UE equation. The negative effect in the 
Q equation to some extent implies an imbalance in access to HE by socio-economic 
background. 
Finally we find some evidence that the internal rate of return to university 
education is negatively related with the demand for HE prior to 1970s, but this effect is 
not significant afterwards. However, this might be caused by the nature of data. As 
discussed in Appendix C, our estimated series of  IRR only dates back to 1975 due to 
data limitations. In the absence of an appropriate data set prior to 1975, we used the data 
in Wilson’s work as a proxy of so as to obtain a complete series covering the whole time 
period in our question. To investigate this further and provide checks on the robustness of 
the estimated effects of college costs, it is necessary to run the regressions using a sample 
from 1975 to 2008 to ensure that our  IRR data is consistent. Results are discussed in 
Section 5.4. 
5.4. Robustness Checks 
Tables A8-A11 report the results for a shorter span of time from 1975 to 2008, as a check 
of robustness of the estimated coefficients of net college costs discussed in the previous 
section. As indicated in the results, when we exclude Wilson’s IRR data from the 
regressions, this variable enters the models insignificantly, while there are no obvious 
changes in the sign or magnitude of the coefficients of college costs variable. This 
suggests that our interpretation of the effect of HE finance policy changes is convincing. 
A further limitation of the use of the SUR model is that it assumes a diagonal 25 
 
variance-covariance matrix, i.e. that the covariances of the errors are zero. This could be 
particularly problematic when we include contemporaneous right hand side regressors. 
Our robustness checks described in our appendix (Tables A12-A15), where  ΔlnQt  is 
replaced by  ΔlnQt−1 in the UE equation, suggest that our results may be sensitive to 
this assumption. This is understandable given our small sample size, but nevertheless 
unavoidable. 
6.  Policy Simulations of Increasing Tuition Fees 
The study of the effect of HE funding on the demand for HE is very topical. A recent 
Universities UK publication (Universities UK, 2009) suggests that students are 
insensitive to variations in tuition fees below £5,000 a year. The report draws a 
conclusion from a projection of funding scenarios that the cap of tuition fees may have to 
be raised to £5,000 or £7,000. In addition, The Times states that ‘in a written statement, 
rather than an announcement in person, Lord Mandelson is expected to say that students 
from poorer families have not been put off from applying to university by higher tuition 
fees since 2006’, and claims that ‘students could be paying more than double the present 
fees for university courses’ (‘Students face doubling of fees and rise in loan costs’, The 
Times, 9th November 2009). The article also states that ‘some vice-chancellors are 
pressing for fees to rise to £7,000 a year... Others believe that £5,000 a year is a more 
realistic level.’ Another report published by the Department for Business, Innovation and 
Skills suggests that ‘financial factors tend not to dent HE aspirations among those 
planning to apply. Indeed, they tend to be outweighed by a range of non-financial factors, 
especially for younger people’ (Usher et al., 2010, p.1). 
In November 2009, an inquiry team chaired by Lord Browne of Madingley was 
appointed by the Government to look at the reform of HE funding system, and 
specifically the level of student fees. In reply to the first call for evidence, quite a few 
universities claimed that the introduction of variable fees has had not harmed access. For 
example, in Imperial College London, since the introduction of variable fees there has 
been 
‘an increase of 17.3% in total undergraduate applicants, and nearly 22% in 
accepted applicants from the bottom three socio-economic groups. In 2008/09, 13.8% of 26 
 
applicants and 13.6% of undergraduate intake were from the bottom three 
socio-economic groups. Further to this, the proportion of undergraduate students at the 
College from state schools and colleges has increased to 66.8% in 2009/10, an increase of 
nearly 8% in three years. This demonstrates that the introduction of fees has not 
discouraged students from the lower earning social groups from applying and being 
accepted by one of the most selective HEIs in the UK’. (Independent Review of Higher 
Education Funding and Student Finance - First Call for Evidence, Imperial College 
London, January 2010, p.3) 
The Browne Review, published in October 2010, proposed removal of the cap of 
tuition fees. The government’s response was to allow universities in England to charge 
fees up to £9,000 per year from September 2012. 
At first sight the above-mentioned statements are consistent with the aggregate 
statistics of university entrance rate which has exhibited a continuous upward trend so far. 
However, given the estimated coefficients on  COST Δ  which is negative, if the tuition 
fees continue to rise, the net college costs might be increased to such a high level that 
would deter the enrolment. To illustrate this, proceeding on the basis of our estimated 
results, we present a simulation of a potential upcoming reform. We explore the 
consequences of a rise in tuition fees. Specifically we estimate the effect of an increase in 
fees to £7,000, and given the new fees policy, a higher level of £9,000, ceteris paribus. 










= γ                                               ( 5 )  
From equation (5) the following equation is derived, reflecting the change in 
t UE ln   from 2008 to 2009 is 
2008 2009 4 2009 ln ) ( ln UE COST d UE Δ + Δ = Δ γ                           ( 6 )  
where  2009 COST Δ   is the increase in fees in real terms. Based on equation (6) and 
the estimated  4 γ   in Table 1 (-0.107 and -0.063 for boys and girls, respectively), we can 
then predict the new university entrance rate with the tuition fees rising, and compare it 
with the current university entrance rate  2008 UE . Under the assumption that fees rise from 
the current level (as of year 2008) of £3,145 to £7,000, results suggest that the university 
entrance rate will drop by 5.33 and 2.84 percentage points for boys and girls, respectively. 
Furthermore, assuming that fees are increased to £9,000, the calculation indicates that the 
university enrolment rate would decrease from 2008 by 7.51 percentage points for boys, 27 
 
and 4.92 percentage points for girls.
24 This projection assumes that there have been no 
changes to grants and loans, and that the underlying regression results are valid for ‘out 
of sample’ predictions. Such assumptions are only a first approximation to the scale of 
the effect of raising fees. 
Put another way, we can also calculate the rate of fees at which the university 
enrolment ceases to increase. Proceeding on the basis of the empirical results, we find a 
threshold of approximately £3,315 for the male cohort, and £4,610 for the female. This 
suggests that if the rates of fees pass these threshold levels, the HE system would 
experience an adverse impact on the demand for university places. 
Although the past years have seen no adverse impact on widening participation 
from the introduction of the higher cap of fees, all the above results suggest that if fees 
are increased to a certain threshold level, it will reduce the demand for HE. Furthermore, 
there might be a significant impact on some poorer and less selective institutions who 
recruit their students predominantly from these marginal groups. These effects could be 
all the more important under likely imminent funding cuts to higher and further education. 
In the pre-budget on 9th December 2009, some £600m of cuts to the HE and science and 
research budgets by 2012-13 were identified, on top of £180m the government asked 
universities to find in ‘efficiency savings’ by 2011 (announced by the Department for 
Innovation, Universities and Skills on 6th May 2009), and a further cut of £135m 
(announced by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills on 22nd December 
2009) to meet additional pressures. According to the most recent HEFCE university 
funding publication (HEFCE Summary of 2011/12 Grant Tables (March 2011)), those in 
the bottom quartile of all 131 institutions in England only received 3.60% of the total 
recurrent research, access and teaching funding from HEFCE over 2009-10. Under the 
circumstance that the current level of tuition fees is to be lifted, and if the participation 
rate drops subsequently as predicted in our model, then the already large resourcing 
                                                            
24To obtain elasticities from the coefficient estimates we use the sample means of  COST (2328.66) and 
UE   (10.69 for males and 8.78 for females). For the latter case, our estimates generate a marginal effect of 
-0.0013 for the male cohort and -0.0007 for the female cohort, suggesting an elasticity of the university 
entrance rate with respect to the net college cost is -0.29 for males, and -0.19 for females. Note that since 
our data only goes to 2008 these predictions would nominally be dated at 2008 in the event of these 
changes. As a result our predictions could be slightly different for 2010'11 if we had 2009, and 2010 data to 
base them on. 28 
 
disparities between institutions will be exacerbated and may endanger the very existence 
of some of less well established institutions. Furthermore, it is quite likely that raising the 
tuition fees in the way we have explained could give rise to some issues in the equity of 
educational access to HE as it is these less well established universities which have a 
better track record in providing HE places to students from less wealthy parental 
backgrounds. 
7.  Conclusion 
A central and controversial issue currently facing HE policy makers in any country is 
whether less generous student financial support arrangements have any effect on the 
demand for HE. Specifically in the UK, at the time of writing, the government announces 
the controversial plan to allow universities in England to charge fees up to £9,000 per 
year from September 2012. Hence the motivation for this paper is both clear and timely. 
This paper models the nature of the post war time-series demand for UK HE. Specifically 
we set out to exploit the regime changes in HE funding to identify the causal impact of 
these regime changes on the demand for HE, using the recently developed procedures of 
Qu and Perron (2007) for determining system breaks in a SUR model. 
Three broad conclusions can be drawn from our results. First, there are various 
important factors influencing post-compulsory education participation which include: the 
average academic attainment measured by exam results in GCSE and the probability of 
employment for early school leavers (in the  S   equation), the post-16 staying on rate (in 
the  Q  equation), and the qualified leaver rate (in the  UE equation). 
Second, our test for structural break points suggests that regime changes in HE 
funding, especially the introduction of student loans in 1990, and the scrapping of student 
grants initiated from early 1990s, did result in significant structural changes in the SUR 
model of post-compulsory education participation. 
Our final conclusion is the most important as it relates to policy. Our results 
suggest that higher college costs will deter HE participation, and have a larger adverse 
impact on young males than young females. Our policy simulation suggests that if fees 
are increased to £9,000, the university entrance rate would decrease from 2008 by 7.51 
and 4.92 percentage points for boys and girls, respectively. 
All in all, sharing the costs between the society and the individual participants in 
HE ought to be both efficient and equitable. Policy makers should be fully aware of the 
potential consequences of the soaring costs of HE and the trade-off between resource and 
equity. Realistically any change to a system of HE funding which relied more on 
individual student fees could endanger some of the less well established institutions. 29 
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Fig. 2. Student Grants, Loans, and Fees 
 






































































































































































































































Real Average LEA Expenditure on Maintenance Per Student (at 2010 Prices)
Real Average Maintenance Loan Per Student (at 2010 Prices)
Real Average Fees Loan Per Student (at 2010 Prices)
Real Average Rate of Fees (at 2010 Prices)35 





1988: GCSE replaced 
O-Level
1990: Student loans 
(mortgage)




1999: Student grants 
abolished
2004: EMA rolled out 
nationally
2006: Variable fees & 
tuition fees loan
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Main Policy Changes36 
Table 1. Structural Break Test and Estimation (Model IV): 1958-2008 
Intercept ∆lnGCSEt ∆lnYUt-1 ∆lnCt Intercept ∆lnGUt-1 ∆lnCt ∆lnSt-2 Intercept ∆lnGUt-1 ∆lnCt ∆lnIRRt-1 ∆COSTt ∆lnQt
0.032 0.396 0.027 -0.096 0.048 0.091 0.221 -0.075 -0.016 0.130* 0.593 -0.743*** 0.034 0.335
(0.022) (0.516) (0.033) (0.384) (0.036) (0.063) (0.422) (0.529) (0.027) (0.068) (0.542) (0.200) (0.047) (0.219)
-0.008 0.964*** 0.141*** -0.011 0.018 -0.014 -0.198 0.037 -0.009 -0.019 0.160 0.127 -0.020 0.962***
(0.013) (0.249) (0.033) (0.326) (0.015) (0.047) (0.407) (0.155) (0.016) (0.044) (0.425) (0.186) (0.053) (0.314)
-0.004 0.353 0.074 0.053 -0.002 -0.063 0.623 0.698** -0.003 -0.141 0.669 0.212 -0.107** 0.655**






Intercept ∆lnGCSEt ∆lnYUt-1 ∆lnCt Intercept ∆lnGUt-1 ∆lnCt ∆lnSt-2 Intercept ∆lnGUt-1 ∆lnCt ∆lnIRRt-1 ∆COSTt ∆lnQt
0.051** 0.039 0.030 -0.294 0.065* 0.151*** 0.013 0.138 0.030 0.126** 0.110 -1.812** -0.013 0.199
(0.021) (0.363) (0.030) (0.345) (0.034) (0.047) (0.448) (0.510) (0.027) (0.053) (0.446) (0.721) (0.042) (0.195)
-0.001 0.635*** 0.110*** 0.066 0.029 -0.051 -0.065 0.178 0.039** -0.149** -0.592 0.149 -0.073 0.652***
(0.013) (0.202) (0.034) (0.338) (0.018) (0.069) (0.519) (0.179) (0.018) (0.066) (0.452) (0.171) (0.054) (0.219)
-0.002 0.311 0.030 0.059 0.006 -0.073 0.601 0.717* 0.014 0.014 0.204 -0.116 -0.063* 0.853**

































Standard errors in parentheses      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 37 
Appendix A: Data Appendix 
Variable Definition  Data  Source
S 
(male/female) 
16-year-old age group attending schools and 
colleges of further education as a percentage of 
16-year-olds 
Statistics of Education
Schools and Pupils in England 
Statistics of Education in Wales 
Schools in Wales 
Statistics of Further and Higher Education in Polytechnics and Colleges  
Education Statistics of the UK 
Education and Training Statistics for the UK 
Statistics of Education in Wales  
Higher Education, Further Education and Training Statistics in Wales  
Q 
(male/female) 
Qualified leavers with two or more 'A' level  
passes as a percentage of the relevant age 
groups 
Statistics of Education 
Statistics of Education, School Leavers, CES and GCE  
Statistics of School Examinations, GCSE and GCE 
Statistics of Education, Public Examinations, GCSE & GCE 
Statistical First Releases 
UE 
(male/female) 
Entrants to first-degree courses as a percentage 
of the relevant age groups  
Returns from Universities and Universities Colleges  
Statistics of Education 
University Statistics 
Statistics of Further and Higher Education in Polytechnics and Colleges 
Further and Higher Education and Training Statistics in Wales 
UCAS data 
GCSE  School leavers with five or more A*-C  as a 
percentage of age groups 
Statistics of School Leavers, CSE and GCE 
Statistics of Education, School Examinations, GCSE and GCE  
Statistics of Education, Public Examinations, GCSE and GCE  
Statistics of Education: Public Examinations, GCSE/GNVQ and 
GCE/AGNVQ in England 
Statistical First Releases 
U 
(male/female) 
Per cent adult males/females unemployment in 
Great Britain 
British Labour Statistics: Historical Abstract 1886-1968
Department of Employment Gazette 
Labour Market Trends 
Economic & Labour Market Review 
GU 
(male/female) 
Per cent unemployment of UK domiciled 
males/females who obtained undergraduate 
qualification through full-time study 
First Destination of University Graduates 
First Destination of Students Leaving HEIs 
Destinations of Leavers from HE 
Self calculation for years 1955-1962 
YU 
(male/female) 
Per cent unemployment among males/females 
aged 18 and 19 
The Relative Pay and Employment of Young People by William Wells
Department of Employment Gazette 
Self calculation based on Labour Force Survey 
C  Per-capita consumer's expenditure at 2006 price  
(deflated by RPI), £ 
Annual Abstract of Statistics and The Blue Book 
CLASS  Proportion of employees in the UK working in 
a public administration, defence or professional 
service or related occupation 
Annual Abstract of Statistics
IRR  Internal rate of return to undertaking a graduate 
job (See details in Appendix C) 
Wilson (1980, 1983 and 1985)  
Self calculation based on New Earnings Survey and Labour 
Force Survey 
COST  Average net college cost per student, calculated 
as a weighted sum of fees, grants, maintenance 
loans and fee loans, at 2006 price  (deflated by 
RPI), £ 
Statistics of Education
Statistics of Finance & Awards  
Statistics of Education: Finance & Awards  
Statistics of Education: Student Support England and Wales 
Statistical First Releases  
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Appendix B. Applicants to University 
For completeness we add a further set of figures in this Appendix relating to trends in 
university applications. In examining these figures it should be remembered that up until 
1993 prospective students could apply to polytechnics, universities or both. Unfortunately 
central data on polytechnic applications prior to 1993 do not exist. In addition, even if 
they did, we would not know the extent of double-counting (of students who applied to 
both types of institutions). In this Appendix we provide data on the number of male and 
female applicants to university by year and the fraction of applicants who gain entrance, 
respectively in Figures A1 and A2. 
What we see from Figure A2 is that, post 1994, between 75-80% of applicants get 
into university. This is approximately the fraction of any cohort who are qualified and 
wish to continue their studies. This substantiates the view that the Robbins principle of 
1963 has broadly been upheld. This also, conveniently establishes our point that supply 
of university places is, to all intents and purposes, unconstrained. 
Looking further at the pre 1993 period it is clear that the university sector took 
between 50-55% of applicants -- where presumably the other 25-30% of applicants went 
to polytechnics. One clear ‘blip’ in the data occurs in the 1982/83 period which coincided 
with the Thacher university cuts of 1981. The dip in this fraction could be a pattern of the 
future, i.e. 2011-2013 with the upcoming cuts in higher education.    
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Appendix C. Internal Rate of Return Calculation 
Here we explain how to calculate the internal rate of return to undertaking a graduate job. 
We use LFS and NES to calculate the series. First of all we give the definitions of a 
graduate and non-graduate. On the basis of these definitions, graduate jobs and 
non-graduate job are classified in order to sort out the average earnings of graduate jobs 
and non-graduate jobs by age. 
C.1. Definitions of Graduate and Non-graduate 
The LFS collects information on the highest qualification for each individual, and we use 
this information to define graduates and non-graduates. A graduate is defined as an 
individual holding a higher-education degree. This mainly includes higher degree, 
National Vocational Qualification Level 5, first degree and other (unspecified) degrees. 
An individual is classified as a non-graduate if his highest qualification is below a 
higher-education degree. 
C.2. Definitions of Graduate Job and Non-graduate Job 
Both NES and LFS record occupational information for each individual. The 
occupational codes and job titles vary over time, however, and in some cases different 
occupational codes are adopted in these surveys even in the same year. To deal with the 
discrepancies in the occupational coding, we convert each data set’s occupational codes
1 
to the most recent version of the UK national occupational classification, SOC2000, at 
3-digit level (minor groups). Consistency checks are conducted on the basis of text 
descriptions as developed by the Office for National Statistics. 
A consistent occupational coding then allows us to work on the LFS data to 
classify ‘graduate jobs’ and ‘non-graduate jobs’ for each year. An occupation (at 3-digit 
level of SOC 2000) is defined as a graduate job if the proportion of graduates in it is no 
less than 50%; otherwise it is defined as a non-graduate job. 
We then apply these definitions to the NES. This is done by matching SOC2000 
across the LFS and NES. Since the LFS data are not available for some years before 1983, 
                                                            
1Roughly speaking, these occupational codes include CODOT and the Key list of Occupations for 
Statistical Purposes (KOS) in earlier years, 1990 Standard Occupational Classification (SOC90), and 2000 
Standard Occupational Classification (SOC2000).  
40 
 
the definitions derived from the 1977 LFS are used for NES 1975-1976, the 1979 LFS 
definitions for NES 1978, the 1981 LFS definitions for NES 1980, and the 1983 LFS 
definitions for NES 1982. 
C.3. Construction of the Internal Rate of Return 
The methodology for calculating the internal rate of return ( IRR ) to undertaking a 
graduate job follows Ziderman (1973), Wilson (1980, 1983 and 1985) and Dolton and 
Chung (2004). 














                                                ( C 1 )  
Where  t B , in our analysis, is interpreted as the earnings from undertaking a 
graduate job, and  t C   is the foregone earnings that the individual could have earned in an 
alternative occupation, in this case, a non-graduate job.
2 
We calculate the average earnings of graduate jobs and non-graduate jobs by age.
3 
For university graduates, we assume that they enter universities at 18 and receive 
maintenance grants at ages 18-20. Their income profiles are therefore adjusted to include 
the student maintenance. 
Since real earnings may be expected to rise over time, it is necessary to adjust 
these cross-sectional age-earnings profiles to approximate the lifetime earnings patterns 
of given educated individuals ageing over time. In practice earnings profiles are adjusted 
to account for the expected growth in real earnings of 2 per cent per annum.
4 
Our estimates of  IRR (and present values of lifetime earnings), based on the 
NES and LFS, date back to 1975. In order to extend the analysis of rates of return 
backwards in time beyond 1975, we decide to refer to Wilson’s related work for a proxy 
of  IRR  in the absence of superior data sets prior to 1975. Wilson (1980, 1983 and 
1985) examines the average private rate of return to becoming a professional scientist or 
                                                            
2For simplicity the direct costs to the individual of taking a course are assumed to be zero. 
3We define similar samples for analysis: for NES, we use a sub-sample of full-time workers whose normal 
basic hours are no less than 30 per week; and for LFS, full-time employees whose total usual hours in the 
main job are no less than 30 hours per week. 
4This assumption is close to the sample mean of the rate of growth of per-capital Gross National Income 
over time for the past 60 years, which is 0.0235.  
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engineer. In his work,  t B   is the earnings of qualified scientists or engineers. The data is 
taken from surveys carried out by various professional institutions. The alternative 
income profile,  t C , represents the median earnings of all workers. The basic source for 
this comparison income profile is the NES, which was not started until 1968. There was 
no survey directly comparable to the NES prior to 1968, however. Therefore in his 
exercise to extend the analysis backwards, Wilson claims that the comparison income 
profile can be regarded as stable in shape over a 10-15 year period, and adjusts the NES 
data according to movements in the Index of average earnings, or movements in the 
earnings of manual men from the DE’s earnings and hours survey when the former index 
is unavailable. In this way he extends the estimates back to 1955. 
Wilson does not conduct the analysis by gender, but as he argues, the proportion 
of females in the professional institutions is very small, particularly for engineers. 
Therefore the estimates taken from Wilson’s work are treated as  IRR of males. For 
most of the years, Wilson provides various estimated IRR to different professional 
occupations. In this case, for each individual year we take averages of the estimates. In 
addition, for those unpublished years, the average of the estimates of the years before and 
after is inserted. Putting together these adjusted estimates and our results of   IRR , we 
construct a series of males’  IRR  from 1955 to 2008.
5 
This series of males’  IRR is then utilized to run OLS regressions to predict 
females’  IRR  for the earlier years from 1955 to 1974.   
                                                            
5It should be noted that Wilson's comparison income series is based on median incomes, while our 
age-earnings profiles used here are based on mean incomes. A similar exercise was actually done based on 
median incomes. There is no much difference between the outcomes, but the estimated  IRR  based on 




Appendix D. Stationarity Tests 
To test whether the stochastic variables are stationary, we first perform Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller unit root tests. Table A2 presents the test results. The MacKinnon 
Approximate P-values suggest that the majority of these variables are integrated of order 
1,  ) 1 ( I . As a matter of fact, most of the tests with one-lag specification overwhelmingly 
reject the null hypothesis of a unit root for first differences of the variables. 
A well known weakness of the Dickey-Fuller style unit root test rests on the 
failure to account for structural changes. As a result, the test is biased towards the 
nonrejection of the unit root null in the presence of structural shifts. To overcome this 
complication, quite a few strategies have been devised to test for unit roots allowing for 
structural changes. Perron (1989) extends the Augmented Dickey-Fuller procedure by 
incorporating a single break in the model. In Perron’s strategy, the dating of the potential 
break is predetermined exogenously based on an ex post examination or knowledge of 
the data. This is questioned by, among others, Zivot and Andrews (1992) who develop a 
methodology for endogenizing the break point. Their approach allows for a single 
structural change in the intercept and/or the trend of the series, and selects by a grid 
search the optimal break point where the t-statistic from the Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
test of unit root is at a minimum, namely most negative and least favourable to the unit 
root null hypothesis. The test allowing for a single break point has been extended by, for 
example, Clemente, Montañés and Reyes (1998) who propose unit root tests that allow 
for two structural changes in the mean of the series, either additive outliers (the AO 
model, which captures a sudden change in a series) or innovational outliers (the IO model, 
allowing for a gradual shift in the mean of the series). 
Considering the weakness of Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests, we then perform the 
Zivot-Andrews routine to test the unit root of first-differenced series, accounting for a 
single potential structural shift in the variable. As reported in Table A3, tests of most of 
the series reject the unit root null, except for  t UEm ln Δ  and  t UEf ln Δ . We then use the 
Clemente-Montañés-Reyes unit root test with single mean shift to test the stationarity of 
t UEm ln ,  t UEm ln Δ ,  t UEf ln  and  t UEf ln Δ . Test results are shown in Table A4. 
Despite the structural changes, we are unable to reject the null of a unit root in  t UEm ln   
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and  t UEf ln . But the tests reject the null of a unit root in  t UEm ln Δ  and  t UEf ln Δ . 
Therefore we conclude that neither  t UEm ln Δ  nor  t UEf ln Δ   exhibits a unit root.  
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Table A1.  Rates of Grants and Loans Since 1962 
Definition: Full year maximum rates                                           Key: Grant Rates Loan Rates 
Year   Parental Home  London  Elsewhere  Oxbridge 
   £   £   £   £ 
1962 240 335  320  345 
1963 240 335  320  345 
1964 240 335  320  345 
1965 275 370  340  370 
1966 275 370  340  370 
1967 275 370  340  370 
1968 290 395  360  400 
1969 290 395  360  400 
1970 290 420  380  420 
1971 345 465  430  465 
1972 355 480  445  480 
1973 390 520  485  520 
Abolition of Oxbridge rate 
1974 475 665  605 
1975 570 810  740 
1976 675 955  875 
1977 785 1145  1010 
1978 870 1315  1100 
1979 985 1485  1245 
1980 1125 1695  1430 
1981 1180 1825  1535 
1982 1225 1900  1595 
1983 1275 1975  1660 
1984 1435 2100  1775 
1985 1480 2165  1830 
1986 1510 2246  1901 
1987 1567 2330  1972 
1988 1630 2425  2050 
1989 1710 2650  2155 
Introduction of mortgage-style student loans 
1990 1795  330  2845  460  2265  420 
1991 1795  460  2845  660  2265  580 
1992 1795  570  2845  830  2265  715 
1993 1795  670  2845  940  2265  800 
1994 1615  915  2560  1375  2040  1150 





Home London  Elsewhere Oxbridge  
Parental 
Home London  Elsewhere   
Parental 
Home London  Elsewhere 
   £   £   £   £    £   £   £     £   £   £  
Introduction of tuition fees (fixed fees) and income-contingent student loans               
   Old: Mandatory Scheme    New: Student Support Scheme     
1998/99   1480 1325 2225  2145  1810  1735   480  2325 1225 3145 810  2735     
1999/00   1515 1360 2280  2200  1855  1780       2875    4480    3635     
2000/01   1555 1395 2335  2255  1900  1825       2950    4590    3725     
2001/02   1555 1395 2335  2255  1900  1870       3020    4700    3815     
2002/03   1625 1465 2450  2365  1990  1915       3090    4815    3905     
2003/04   1500 1500 2420  2420  1960  1960       3165    4930    4000     
Introduction of Higher Education Grant   
2004/05   1705 1535 2570  2480  2090  2005   1000 3240 1000 5050 1000  4095    
2005/06   1745 1535 2635  2480  2140  2055   1000 3320 1000 5175 1000  4195    
Introduction of variable fees & Tuition Fees Loan 
        Old: Fixed Fees System    New: Variable Fees System 
2006/07   1790 1615 2700  2605  2195  2105   1000 3415 1000 6170 1000  4405  2700 3415 2700 6170 2700 4405
2007/08                          1000 3495 1000 6315 1000  4510  2765 3495 2765 6315 2765 4510
 
Sources: NUS Press Pack 2005-06, 2007-08. http://www.slc.co.uk/statistics/facts_figures.html (last accessed: 1 July 2010) 
 
1996 1400  1260  2105  2035  1710  1645 
1997 1435  1290  2160  2085  1755  1685  
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Table A2.  Augmented Dikey-Fuller Unit Root Test – MacKinnon Approximate P-Values 
Variable  At Level  At First Difference 
    lags(1) lags(2) lags(3) lags(4) lags(1) lags(2) lags(3) lags(4) 
ln UEmt  0.5963   0.6180   0.8062   0.8307   0.0333   0.0043   0.0051   0.0078  
ln UEft  0.8667   0.8112   0.8243   0.8498   0.0428   0.0340   0.0182   0.0315  
ln Qmt  0.3166   0.5216   0.6403   0.7843   0.0007   0.0438   0.0733   0.0658  
ln Qft  0.2885   0.4254   0.5388   0.6346   0.0058   0.0679   0.1883   0.1316  
ln Smt  0.3920   0.4817   0.5342   0.6302   0.0000   0.0048   0.0083   0.0198  
ln Sft  0.2698   0.3207   0.4149   0.4949   0.0001   0.0069   0.0236   0.0153  
ln GCSEmt  0.9249   0.9308   0.9601   0.9760   0.0005   0.0069   0.0998   0.1782  
ln GCSEft  0.9099   0.8973   0.9276   0.9471   0.0001   0.0194   0.0367   0.0855  
ln Umt  0.5655   0.4203   0.5550   0.5552   0.0000   0.0000   0.0023   0.0196  
ln Uft  0.4949   0.5800   0.7454   0.4430   0.0000   0.0000   0.0811   0.1920  
ln GUmt  0.1961   0.5161   0.6341   0.6255   0.0000   0.0000   0.0015   0.0039  
ln GUft  0.0794   0.3776   0.3768   0.5326   0.0000   0.0004   0.0001   0.0019  
ln YUmt  0.5335   0.5941   0.3163   0.3096   0.0000   0.0000   0.0008   0.0265  
ln YUft  0.5971   0.7067   0.6145   0.4750   0.0000   0.0000   0.0041   0.0716  
ln WWmt  0.9615   0.9648   0.9424   0.9703   0.0002   0.0195   0.0157   0.2242  
ln WWft  0.7983   0.8117   0.8021   0.9042   0.0001   0.0056   0.0019   0.0643  
ln IRRmt  0.1833   0.1609   0.2721   0.1728   0.0000   0.0012   0.1453   0.0172  
ln IRRft  0.0411   0.0753   0.1109   0.0474   0.0000   0.0001   0.0104   0.0255  
ln Ct  0.6283   0.7514   0.8200   0.8597   0.0000   0.0008   0.0202   0.1029  
ln ClassRate t  0.7813   0.7066   0.6463   0.4355   0.0014   0.0032   0.0412   0.0764  
ln HHIncome t  0.6194   0.6657   0.6226   0.6089   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0014  
RCOSTt ( Def1)  0.9559   0.9474   0.8862   0.8695   0.0000   0.0034   0.0242   0.0194  
RCOSTt ( Def2)  0.9337   0.9246   0.8430   0.8209   0.0000   0.0029   0.0225   0.0180  
RCOSTt ( Def3)  0.8516   0.8437   0.7080   0.6736   0.0000   0.0022   0.0205   0.0164  
RCOSTt ( Def4)  0.9463   0.9345   0.8566   0.8329   0.0000   0.0043   0.0288   0.0235  
To test the stationarity of variables we use ADF unit root test where the null hypothesis of unit root is tested against the stationarity alternative.  
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Hamilton (1994) describes four different cases to which the ADF test can be applied. We decide which case to be used for each variable according to 
the pattern over time. Instead of reporting the ADF statistics, we tabulate the MacKinnon Approximate P-values here. The P-values reveal that the 
majority of variables are  ) 1 ( I . Experiments with different numbers of lag terms yield similar conclusions.  
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Table A3.  Zivot–Andrews Unit Root Test 
Variable At Level At First Difference
Allowing for a break in  
Intercept 
(Critical values:  
1%: -5.43, 5%: -4.80) 
Trend 
(Critical values:  
1%: -4.93, 5%: -4.42) 
Both 
(Critical values:  
1%: -5.57, 5%: -5.08) 
Intercept 
(Critical values:  
1%: -5.43, 5%: -4.80) 
Trend 
(Critical values:  
1%: -4.93, 5%: -4.42) 
Both 
(Critical values:  
1%: -5.57, 5%: -5.08) 
























ln UEmt  -4.476 1980 -3.710 1968 -4.757 1979  -3.940 1988 -3.629 1968 -4.197 1970 
ln UEft  -4.134 1981 -3.450 1968 -4.298 1980  -3.432 1988 -2.937 1967 -3.524 1988 
ln Qmt  -3.273 1979 -2.469 1987 -3.146 1992  -9.557***  1988  -8.177***  1974  -9.463***  1988 
ln Qft  -2.911 1964 -2.463 2002 -2.847 1992  -5.916***  1988  -4.134***  1976  -5.915***  1988 
ln Smt  -3.061 1974 -2.599 1993 -3.180 1974  -6.912***  1982  -6.663***  1975  -7.010***  1982 
ln Sft  -3.103 1963 -2.902 1969 -3.002 1974  -7.291***  1988  -6.997***  1975  -7.240***  1988 
ln GCSEmt  -3.772 1978 -3.010 1986 -3.403 1978  -6.270***  1988  -5.519***  1976  -6.224***  1988 
ln GCSEft  -4.529 1988 -2.778  198  -4.127 1988  -6.010***  1988  -4.661***  1975  -6.286***  1988 
ln Umt  -3.335 1997 -4.189 1986 -4.425 1980  -8.314***  1956  -8.238***  1958  -8.333***  1982 
ln Uft  -4.253 1975 -2.435 1985 -4.553 1975  -6.830***  1987  -6.134***  1977  -6.755***  1985 
ln GUmt  -4.010 1996 -3.871 1983 -4.751 1980  -6.662***  1983  -6.171***  2000  -6.571***  1983 
ln GUft  -3.644 1975 -3.694 1983 -4.207 1979  -6.496***  1983  -5.892***  2001  -6.626***  1966 
ln YUmt  -3.038  1969 -4.432* 1984  -4.574  1980 -8.228***    1984  -7.805***  1968  -8.143***  1984 
ln YUft  -4.006 1974 -3.308 1982 -4.636 1975  -7.493***  1985  -6.949***  1976  -7.467***  1978 
ln WWmt  -3.101 1967 -4.075 1974 -4.685 1972  -7.721***  1975  -5.955***  2003  -8.465***  1975 
ln WWft  -3.916 1971 -3.974 1975 -6.091 1971  -8.128***  1975  -6.510***  1989  -8.452***  1975 
ln IRRmt  -3.441 1965 -4.167 1973 -4.056 1971  -10.918*** 1974 -9.463*** 1990 -11.317*** 1974 
ln IRRft  -3.751 1991 -3.016 1985 -3.755 1991  -7.155***  1977  -6.738***  1983  -7.156***  1977 
ln Ct  -4.659 1974 -3.296 1959 -4.657 1969  -12.635*** 1983 -11.784*** 2002 -12.711*** 1978 
ln ClassRate t  -3.599 1967 -3.445 1982 -3.486 1971  -6.994***  1965  -7.307***  1968  -7.762***  1973 
ln HHIncome t  -5.052** 1992 -4.799** 1964  -4.997***  1992 -6.809***  1971  -6.461***  2003  -7.210***  1971 
RCOSTt ( Def1)  -10.806***  1998 -6.558*** 1993  -10.427***  1998 -10.771*** 1963 -10.534*** 1999 -11.774*** 1998 
RCOSTt ( Def2)  -10.369***  1998 -6.576*** 1994  -10.245***  1998 -10.879*** 1963 -10.613*** 1999 -11.814*** 1998 
RCOSTt ( Def3)  -9.231*** 1998 -6.577*** 1994 -9.668*** 1998 -11.058*** 1963 -10.731*** 1999 -11.837*** 1998 
RCOSTt ( Def4)  -10.665***  1998 -6.272*** 1993  -10.430***  1998 -10.636*** 1963 -10.521*** 1999 -11.905*** 1998 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 
 
The Zivot-Andrews test statistic reported is the minimum Augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic calculated across all potential breaks in the data for three cases: 1) a structural change 
in the intercept of the series is allowed for (and the 1% critical value is -5.43 and the 5% critical value -4.80); 2) a structural change in the trend of the series is allowed for (and the 
1% critical value is -4.93 and the 5% critical value -4.42); and 3) a structural change in the intercept and the trend is allowed for (and the 1% critical value is -5.57 and the 5% 
critical value -5.08). The break point denotes the year when this minimum ADF statistic is obtained.  
 49
Table A4.  Clemente-Montañés-Reyes Unit Root Test for  t UE ln : AO Model 
 
Test for  t UEm ln  with single mean shift    Test for  t UEf ln with single mean shift 
T =   44         optimal breakpoint: 1994    T =   44         optimal breakpoint: 1994 
AR(0)  du1  (rho - 1)  const    AR(0)  du1  (rho - 1)  const 
Coefficient  0.682 -0.130 2.114    Coefficient  1.382 -0.107 1.525 
t-statistic  7.944 -2.415      t-statistic  8.594 -2.111   
P-value  0.000  -3.560  (5% crit. value)    P-value  0.000  -3.560  (5% crit. value) 
            
Test for  t UEm ln Δ with single mean shift    Test for  t UEf ln Δ  with single mean shift 
T =   43         optimal breakpoint: 1994    T =   43         optimal breakpoint: 1991 
AR(0)  du1  (rho - 1)  const    AR(0)  du1  (rho - 1)  const 
Coefficient  -0.004 -0.484 0.029    Coefficient  -0.004 -0.549 0.050 
t-statistic  -0.138 -3.384      t-statistic  -0.203 -3.314   




Table A5. Structural Break Test and Estimation (Model I): 1958-2008 
Intercept ∆lnGCSEt ∆lnUt-1 ∆lnCt Intercept ∆lnGUt-1 ∆lnCt ∆lnSt-2 Intercept ∆lnGUt-1 ∆lnCt ∆lnIRRt-1 ∆COSTt ∆lnQt
0.030 0.470 0.043 -0.140 0.048 0.090 0.220 -0.086 -0.017 0.128* 0.623 -0.757*** 0.040 0.344
(0.018) (0.430) (0.046) (0.315) (0.034) (0.061) (0.407) (0.511) (0.027) (0.068) (0.538) (0.200) (0.047) (0.218)
-0.039*** -0.539 0.378*** 0.627* 0.003 -0.017 -0.016 -0.037 -0.021 -0.037 0.597 0.335 -0.015 0.655
(0.013) (0.380) (0.053) (0.330) (0.016) (0.048) (0.457) (0.159) (0.018) (0.047) (0.500) (0.215) (0.053) (0.402)
-0.008 0.861*** 0.018 -0.071 0.007 -0.018 0.397 0.758*** 0.009 -0.005 0.103 0.117 -0.089** 0.803***






Intercept ∆lnGCSEt ∆lnUt-1 ∆lnCt Intercept ∆lnGUt-1 ∆lnCt ∆lnSt-2 Intercept ∆lnGUt-1 ∆lnCt ∆lnIRRt-1 ∆COSTt ∆lnQt
0.054** 0.013 0.053 -0.343 0.065* 0.151*** 0.010 0.128 0.030 0.125** 0.109 -1.814** -0.014 0.207
(0.022) (0.388) (0.054) (0.374) (0.034) (0.047) (0.448) (0.510) (0.027) (0.052) (0.446) (0.720) (0.042) (0.194)
0.006 0.539** 0.080* -0.050 0.031* -0.063 -0.114 0.180 0.041** -0.157** -0.627 0.148 -0.078 0.626***
(0.014) (0.213) (0.041) (0.360) (0.018) (0.069) (0.519) (0.179) (0.018) (0.066) (0.452) (0.170) (0.054) (0.219)
0.002 0.273 0.033 0.058 0.006 -0.071 0.598 0.715* 0.014 0.014 0.199 -0.115 -0.063* 0.862**
































Standard errors in parentheses      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table A6. Structural Break Test and Estimation (Model II): 1958-2008 
Intercept ∆lnGCSEt ∆lnUt-1 ∆lnCLASSt Intercept ∆lnGUt-1 ∆lnCLASSt ∆lnSt-2 Intercept ∆lnGUt-1 ∆lnCLASSt ∆lnIRRt-1 ∆COSTt ∆lnQt
0.027 0.452 0.044 -0.003 0.071** 0.143** -1.042* 0.047 0.010 0.126 -0.132 -0.630*** 0.022 0.294
(0.020) (0.389) (0.042) (0.378) (0.031) (0.067) (0.591) (0.501) (0.028) (0.082) (0.707) (0.169) (0.047) (0.236)
0.007 -1.309*** 0.459*** -1.761*** 0.022 -0.000 -0.929 -0.072 -0.006 -0.036 -0.231 0.262 -0.007 0.711
(0.015) (0.447) (0.055) (0.571) (0.017) (0.049) (0.684) (0.156) (0.022) (0.054) (0.935) (0.224) (0.057) (0.471)
-0.013 0.667*** -0.003 0.986** 0.025* 0.050 -0.729 0.758*** 0.010 -0.015 0.294 0.158 -0.089** 0.786***






Intercept ∆lnGCSEt ∆lnUt-1 ∆lnCLASSt Intercept ∆lnGUt-1 ∆lnCLASSt ∆lnSt-2 Intercept ∆lnGUt-1 ∆lnCLASSt ∆lnIRRt-1 ∆COSTt ∆lnQt
0.039 0.083 0.042 0.144 0.097*** 0.171*** -1.100** 0.092 0.025 0.106* 0.216 -1.710*** -0.014 0.259
(0.024) (0.378) (0.050) (0.470) (0.028) (0.042) (0.512) (0.426) (0.027) (0.055) (0.561) (0.621) (0.038) (0.198)
-0.019 0.430* 0.151*** 0.464 0.043*** 0.002 -1.517** 0.059 0.028 -0.148** -0.047 0.261 -0.090* 0.236
(0.018) (0.232) (0.044) (0.593) (0.016) (0.052) (0.666) (0.154) (0.023) (0.059) (0.884) (0.174) (0.054) (0.394)
-0.023 0.731** -0.047 1.104** 0.030** -0.006 -0.806 1.158*** 0.015 0.044 -0.208 -0.160 -0.064** 1.027***
































Standard errors in parentheses      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10  
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Table A7. Structural Break Test and Estimation (Model III): 1958-2008 
Intercept ∆lnGCSEt ∆lnYUt-1 ∆lnCLASSt Intercept ∆lnGUt-1 ∆lnCLASSt ∆lnSt-2 Intercept ∆lnGUt-1 ∆lnCLASSt ∆lnIRRt-1 ∆COSTt ∆lnQt
0.019 0.643* 0.011 -0.018 0.064** 0.166** -1.190** 0.167 0.008 0.145* -0.247 -0.541*** 0.005 0.316
(0.021) (0.383) (0.025) (0.398) (0.031) (0.065) (0.581) (0.490) (0.028) (0.084) (0.727) (0.169) (0.048) (0.243)
0.019 -0.602 0.292*** -1.732*** 0.021 -0.001 -0.889 -0.052 -0.003 -0.038 -0.225 0.289 -0.029 0.671
(0.015) (0.419) (0.037) (0.630) (0.017) (0.048) (0.713) (0.156) (0.023) (0.053) (0.974) (0.253) (0.060) (0.475)
-0.019 0.798*** -0.024 0.959** 0.026* 0.044 -0.631 0.741*** 0.010 -0.011 0.209 0.135 -0.088** 0.790***






Intercept ∆lnGCSEt ∆lnYUt-1 ∆lnCLASSt Intercept ∆lnGUt-1 ∆lnCLASSt ∆lnSt-2 Intercept ∆lnGUt-1 ∆lnCLASSt ∆lnIRRt-1 ∆COSTt ∆lnQt
0.037 0.115 0.026 0.124 0.097*** 0.171*** -1.100** 0.092 0.025 0.106* 0.217 -1.709*** -0.015 0.259
(0.023) (0.358) (0.029) (0.447) (0.028) (0.043) (0.513) (0.427) (0.027) (0.055) (0.561) (0.621) (0.038) (0.198)
-0.013 0.486** 0.143*** 0.115 0.043*** 0.002 -1.524** 0.049 0.029 -0.148** -0.052 0.261 -0.091* 0.232
(0.016) (0.221) (0.033) (0.552) (0.016) (0.052) (0.666) (0.154) (0.023) (0.059) (0.884) (0.174) (0.054) (0.394)
-0.019 0.708** -0.034 1.182** 0.030** -0.004 -0.816 1.159*** 0.015 0.044 -0.209 -0.160 -0.065** 1.026***
































Standard errors in parentheses      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10  
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Table A8. Structural Break Test and Estimation (Model I): 1977-2008 
Intercept ∆lnGCSEt ∆lnUt-1 ∆lnCt Intercept ∆lnGUt-1 ∆lnCt ∆lnSt-2 Intercept ∆lnGUt-1 ∆lnCt ∆lnIRRt-1 ∆COSTt ∆lnQt
-0.071** 0.379 0.386*** 1.632** -0.033* 0.019 0.909* 0.317** -0.009 -0.100 0.085 0.076 -0.039 0.674*
(0.028) (0.262) (0.103) (0.639) (0.020) (0.051) (0.478) (0.147) (0.024) (0.065) (0.632) (0.442) (0.045) (0.374)
-0.016 1.013*** 0.006 -0.001 0.006 -0.022 0.388* 0.767*** 0.007 -0.010 0.115 0.121 -0.086*** 0.875***






Intercept ∆lnGCSEt ∆lnUt-1 ∆lnCt Intercept ∆lnGUt-1 ∆lnCt ∆lnSt-2 Intercept ∆lnGUt-1 ∆lnCt ∆lnIRRt-1 ∆COSTt ∆lnQt
0.075** 0.260 -0.196** -1.223* -0.026 -0.006 1.037* 0.310** 0.027 -0.198* -0.171 0.121 -0.104 0.308
(0.032) (0.189) (0.086) (0.644) (0.021) (0.057) (0.536) (0.137) (0.035) (0.106) (0.898) (0.226) (0.065) (0.355)
0.004 0.648** 0.028 -0.219 0.013 -0.093* 0.367* 1.079*** 0.006 0.043 0.025 -0.179 -0.054* 1.116***





























Standard errors in parentheses      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10  
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Table A9. Structural Break Test and Estimation (Model II): 1977-2008 
Intercept ∆lnGCSEt ∆lnUt-1 ∆lnCLASSt Intercept ∆lnGUt-1 ∆lnCLASSt ∆lnSt-2 Intercept ∆lnGUt-1 ∆lnCLASSt ∆lnIRRt-1 ∆COSTt ∆lnQt
0.006 0.391 0.210*** -0.712 0.011 -0.016 -0.645 0.183 -0.015 -0.131* 0.602 0.036 -0.054 0.770**
(0.015) (0.291) (0.068) (0.617) (0.016) (0.052) (0.740) (0.159) (0.018) (0.068) (0.961) (0.438) (0.048) (0.382)
-0.022 0.902*** -0.012 0.833* 0.024** 0.043 -0.598 0.734*** 0.007 -0.017 0.270 0.155 -0.087*** 0.877***






Intercept ∆lnGCSEt ∆lnUt-1 ∆lnCLASSt Intercept ∆lnGUt-1 ∆lnCLASSt ∆lnSt-2 Intercept ∆lnGUt-1 ∆lnCLASSt ∆lnIRRt-1 ∆COSTt ∆lnQt
0.013 0.289 -0.030 -0.012 0.036** -0.040 -1.381** 0.134 0.024 -0.181** -0.170 0.111 -0.100* 0.247
(0.016) (0.188) (0.053) (0.546) (0.014) (0.046) (0.587) (0.138) (0.025) (0.074) (1.028) (0.223) (0.058) (0.413)
-0.020 0.716*** -0.018 1.069** 0.029*** -0.012 -0.796* 1.177*** 0.008 0.050 -0.138 -0.176 -0.054* 1.120***





























Standard errors in parentheses      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10  
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Table A10. Structural Break Test and Estimation (Model III): 1977-2008 
Intercept ∆lnGCSEt ∆lnYUt-1 ∆lnCLASSt Intercept ∆lnGUt-1 ∆lnCLASSt ∆lnSt-2 Intercept ∆lnGUt-1 ∆lnCLASSt ∆lnIRRt-1 ∆COSTt ∆lnQt
-0.008 0.732*** 0.027 0.414 0.022** 0.028 -0.597 0.424*** -0.005 -0.071 0.511 0.175 -0.085*** 0.987***






Intercept ∆lnGCSEt ∆lnYUt-1 ∆lnCLASSt Intercept ∆lnGUt-1 ∆lnCLASSt ∆lnSt-2 Intercept ∆lnGUt-1 ∆lnCLASSt ∆lnIRRt-1 ∆COSTt ∆lnQt
-0.003 0.432*** -0.014 0.652* 0.037*** -0.015 -0.818* 0.435*** 0.012 -0.065 0.155 -0.003 -0.064** 0.904***

























Standard errors in parentheses      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10  
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Table A11. Structural Break Test and Estimation (Model IV): 1977-2008 
Intercept ∆lnGCSEt ∆lnYUt-1 ∆lnCt Intercept ∆lnGUt-1 ∆lnCt ∆lnSt-2 Intercept ∆lnGUt-1 ∆lnCt ∆lnIRRt-1 ∆COSTt ∆lnQt
0.025 0.740*** 0.025 -0.544 0.008 -0.027 -0.026 0.316* 0.010 -0.092 -0.412 -0.060 -0.049 1.063***
(0.016) (0.242) (0.046) (0.355) (0.017) (0.050) (0.430) (0.160) (0.019) (0.064) (0.479) (0.314) (0.044) (0.265)
0.001 0.232 0.102 -0.016 -0.002 -0.067 0.631** 0.720*** -0.003 -0.128 0.616* 0.213 -0.102*** 0.692***






Intercept ∆lnGCSEt ∆lnYUt-1 ∆lnCt Intercept ∆lnGUt-1 ∆lnCt ∆lnSt-2 Intercept ∆lnGUt-1 ∆lnCt ∆lnIRRt-1 ∆COSTt ∆lnQt
0.042*** 0.249 -0.071 -0.714** 0.042** -0.143** -0.599 0.329* 0.046 -0.212* -0.943 0.017 -0.095 0.665**
(0.015) (0.173) (0.043) (0.321) (0.019) (0.062) (0.493) (0.168) (0.033) (0.110) (0.774) (0.229) (0.069) (0.282)
-0.003 0.374 0.047 0.020 0.006 -0.078 0.601** 0.753** 0.015 0.030 0.199 -0.132 -0.059 0.833*
































Table A12. Structural Break Test and Estimation (Model I): Robustness Check 
Intercept ∆lnGCSEt ∆lnUt-1 ∆lnCt Intercept ∆lnGUt-1 ∆lnCt ∆lnSt-2 Intercept ∆lnGUt-1 ∆lnCt ∆lnIRRt-1 ∆COSTt ∆lnQt-1
0.027 0.595 0.023 -0.244 0.038 0.107 0.105 0.070 0.039 0.130* -0.009 -0.428** 0.018 -0.309
(0.022) (0.506) (0.055) (0.383) (0.037) (0.067) (0.442) (0.548) (0.030) (0.074) (0.520) (0.199) (0.041) (0.220)
-0.001 0.694*** 0.159*** -0.024 0.012 0.020 0.308 0.163 -0.005 -0.011 0.403 0.176 -0.048 0.644***






Intercept ∆lnGCSEt ∆lnUt-1 ∆lnCt Intercept ∆lnGUt-1 ∆lnCt ∆lnSt-2 Intercept ∆lnGUt-1 ∆lnCt ∆lnIRRt-1 ∆COSTt ∆lnQt-1
0.057** -0.039 0.065 -0.359 0.066* 0.152*** 0.005 0.111 0.077*** 0.122** -0.171 -1.187 -0.021 -0.240
(0.022) (0.378) (0.053) (0.373) (0.034) (0.047) (0.448) (0.506) (0.028) (0.048) (0.451) (0.769) (0.032) (0.162)
0.006 0.524** 0.077* -0.046 0.031* -0.064 -0.122 0.172 0.056*** -0.219*** -0.686 0.184 -0.111** 0.308
(0.014) (0.205) (0.040) (0.359) (0.018) (0.069) (0.518) (0.176) (0.017) (0.057) (0.446) (0.150) (0.046) (0.198)
0.005 0.166 0.036 0.072 0.008 -0.064 0.620 0.595 -0.007 0.118 0.179 -0.152 -0.016 1.152***



































Standard errors in parentheses      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table A13. Structural Break Test and Estimation (Model II): Robustness Check 
Intercept ∆lnGCSEt ∆lnUt-1 ∆lnCLASSt Intercept ∆lnGUt-1 ∆lnCLASSt ∆lnSt-2 Intercept ∆lnGUt-1 ∆lnCLASSt ∆lnIRRt-1 ∆COSTt ∆lnQt-1
0.022 0.559 0.023 -0.029 0.063* 0.163** -1.177* 0.181 0.053* 0.161** -0.627 -0.447** 0.019 -0.295
(0.027) (0.516) (0.056) (0.530) (0.033) (0.070) (0.632) (0.525) (0.027) (0.079) (0.703) (0.180) (0.041) (0.220)
-0.007 0.734*** 0.150*** 0.280 0.032*** 0.050 -0.854 0.173 0.010 0.001 -0.316 0.184 -0.051* 0.668***






Intercept ∆lnGCSEt ∆lnUt-1 ∆lnCLASSt Intercept ∆lnGUt-1 ∆lnCLASSt ∆lnSt-2 Intercept ∆lnGUt-1 ∆lnCLASSt ∆lnIRRt-1 ∆COSTt ∆lnQt-1
0.039 0.081 0.044 0.143 0.097*** 0.170*** -1.100** 0.101 0.073*** 0.118** 0.012 -1.278** -0.012 -0.244
(0.024) (0.369) (0.048) (0.459) (0.028) (0.042) (0.512) (0.425) (0.022) (0.047) (0.502) (0.638) (0.032) (0.159)
-0.020 -0.247 0.193*** 0.404 0.038** 0.027 -1.565** 0.083 0.040** -0.223*** 0.070 0.461** -0.121** -0.047
(0.018) (0.492) (0.049) (0.581) (0.017) (0.057) (0.680) (0.157) (0.016) (0.070) (0.717) (0.195) (0.052) (0.283)
-0.013 0.493** -0.043 1.111** 0.035** -0.022 -0.642 0.955*** 0.027* 0.023 -1.021 -0.034 -0.055* 0.960***



































Standard errors in parentheses      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10  
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Table A14. Structural Break Test and Estimation (Model III): Robustness Check 
Intercept ∆lnGCSEt ∆lnYUt-1 ∆lnCLASSt Intercept ∆lnGUt-1 ∆lnCLASSt ∆lnSt-2 Intercept ∆lnGUt-1 ∆lnCLASSt ∆lnIRRt-1 ∆COSTt ∆lnQt-1
0.032 0.203 0.036 0.272 0.069* 0.145* -1.088 0.100 0.040 0.140* 0.449 -0.532*** 0.029 -0.310
(0.029) (0.583) (0.036) (0.642) (0.035) (0.074) (0.770) (0.542) (0.027) (0.076) (0.782) (0.170) (0.039) (0.204)
-0.008 0.702*** 0.118*** -0.051 0.030*** 0.053 -0.695 0.193 0.009 0.001 -0.283 0.219 -0.049* 0.679***






Intercept ∆lnGCSEt ∆lnYUt-1 ∆lnCLASSt Intercept ∆lnGUt-1 ∆lnCLASSt ∆lnSt-2 Intercept ∆lnGUt-1 ∆lnCLASSt ∆lnIRRt-1 ∆COSTt ∆lnQt-1
0.036 0.120 0.026 0.125 0.097*** 0.170*** -1.100** 0.098 0.073*** 0.118** 0.013 -1.278** -0.012 -0.244
(0.023) (0.350) (0.028) (0.438) (0.028) (0.043) (0.512) (0.426) (0.022) (0.047) (0.502) (0.638) (0.032) (0.159)
-0.013 0.048 0.164*** 0.002 0.038** 0.027 -1.569** 0.078 0.040** -0.223*** 0.075 0.464** -0.123** -0.046
(0.016) (0.442) (0.035) (0.548) (0.017) (0.057) (0.680) (0.158) (0.016) (0.069) (0.717) (0.195) (0.052) (0.283)
-0.011 0.486** -0.033 1.181** 0.035** -0.020 -0.651 0.961*** 0.028* 0.024 -1.023 -0.034 -0.056* 0.955***
































Standard errors in parentheses      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10  
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Table A15. Structural Break Test and Estimation (Model IV): Robustness Check 
Intercept ∆lnGCSEt ∆lnYUt-1 ∆lnCt Intercept ∆lnGUt-1 ∆lnCt ∆lnSt-2 Intercept ∆lnGUt-1 ∆lnCt ∆lnIRRt-1 ∆COSTt ∆lnQt-1
0.027 0.572 0.014 -0.226 0.037 0.106* 0.105 0.077 0.040 0.129* -0.015 -0.425** 0.016 -0.311
(0.020) (0.459) (0.030) (0.349) (0.035) (0.063) (0.419) (0.521) (0.030) (0.074) (0.519) (0.199) (0.041) (0.220)
-0.009 0.964*** 0.168*** 0.185 0.018 -0.014 -0.136 0.027 -0.002 -0.016 0.207 0.155 -0.032 0.522
(0.013) (0.239) (0.033) (0.324) (0.015) (0.048) (0.426) (0.153) (0.018) (0.050) (0.486) (0.220) (0.057) (0.361)
-0.004 0.350 0.076 0.048 0.000 -0.058 0.624 0.608** -0.009 -0.056 0.571 0.228 -0.061 0.703**






Intercept ∆lnGCSEt ∆lnYUt-1 ∆lnCt Intercept ∆lnGUt-1 ∆lnCt ∆lnSt-2 Intercept ∆lnGUt-1 ∆lnCt ∆lnIRRt-1 ∆COSTt ∆lnQt-1
0.049** 0.075 0.037 -0.201 0.070** 0.142*** 0.052 0.070 0.081*** 0.107** -0.094 -1.220 -0.015 -0.283
(0.020) (0.358) (0.031) (0.336) (0.033) (0.047) (0.425) (0.486) (0.029) (0.051) (0.475) (0.817) (0.034) (0.171)
-0.022 -0.043 0.151*** 0.365 -0.005 0.019 0.604 0.118 0.040** -0.202*** 0.102 0.422** -0.127*** -0.234
(0.015) (0.443) (0.035) (0.406) (0.019) (0.064) (0.596) (0.174) (0.018) (0.062) (0.546) (0.191) (0.048) (0.291)
0.006 0.516** 0.005 -0.167 0.015 -0.062 0.346 1.009*** 0.004 -0.018 0.464* -0.107 -0.045 0.888***





































Standard errors in parentheses      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10  
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Percentage Achieving 5 or More A*-C O-Level/CSE/GCSE (Male)
Percentage Achieving 5 or More A*-C O-Level/CSE/GCSE (Female)
 
Sources: Statistics  of  Education 
  Statistical First Releases (Department for Children, Schools, and Families)  
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Nominal Average LEA Expenditure on Maintenance Per Student Real Average LEA Expenditure on Maintenance Per Student (at 2006 Prices)
Nominal Average Maintenance Loan Per Student Real Average Maintenance Loan Per Student (at 2006 Prices)
Nominal Average Fees Loan Per Student Real Average Fees Loan Per Student (at 2006 Prices)
Nominal Average Rate of Fees Real Average Rate of Fees (at 2006 Prices)
 
Sources: Statistics  of  Education 
  Statistical First Releases (Department for Children, Schools, and Families) 
  Statistical First Releases (Student Loans Company) 
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Male Female Male and Female
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Male Female Male and Female 
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Sources:  Wilson (1980, 1983, 1985) 










































































































































































































































Rate of Fees Average LEA Expenditure on Maintenance










































































































































































































































Rate of Fees Average LEA Expenditure on Maintenance
(Average Maintenance Loan + Average Fees Loan)/3
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Rate of Fees Average LEA Expenditure on Maintenance
(Average Maintenance Loan + Average Fees Loan)/2
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Average Maintenance Loan * 0.21 + Average Fees Loan * 0.33
Average LEA Expenditure on Maintenance
Rate of Fees
 